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Abstract
Is satire revolutionary?  This question brought satire theorists Leonard Feinberg and
Robert C. Elliott to an impasse.  The Revolution Will Not Be Satirised uses Stephen Leacock’s
satire to find an answer.  Feinberg would contend that Leacock’s underlying conservatism keeps
his satirical critique from being revolutionary.  Elliott would contend that Leacock’s critique is
revolutionary because it tears down societal foundations.  Revolutions, however, are more than a
critique: they hinge upon implementing a new ideology.  Because ideology has three
components—critique, ideal, and agency—and because satire, as a critique, emphasises only one
of ideology’s three components, satire lacks the ideological roadmap to guide a revolution. 
Arcadian Adventures and Sunshine Sketches reflect this: they critique western democracy, but
they lack ideological alternatives to revolve into.  Given that Adventures’ and Sketches’ critiques
remain valid, it appears that Leacock’s two greatest satires failed to spawn revolutionary change,
but succeeded in diagnosing intractable human conditions. 
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Chapter One: Let’s Talk Leacock
Stephen Leacock is a satirist.  But Stephen Leacock is also a political economist.  As a
political economist, Leacock warns that at its worst, democracy produces the election “of the rule
of ‘cliques’ and ‘interests’ and ‘bosses;’... of genial incompetents popular as spendthrifts; of
crooked partisans warm to their friends and bitter to their enemies; of administration by a party
for a party; and of the insidious poison of commercial greed defiling the wells of public honesty”
(Unsolved Riddle 113-14).  How does Leacock believe this unfolds?  Surprisingly, his marquee
writing in political economy Elements of Political Science is rather silent on the issue.  And his
complementary writings such as The Unsolved Riddle of Social Justice and Our Heritage of
Liberty fail to provide comprehensive insights into this belief.  To understand how Leacock sees
these negative forces of democracy at play requires an examination of his two greatest satires,
Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town (1912) and Arcadian Adventures with the Idle Rich (1914). 
Both books close with chapters about elections, and neither book is particularly reassuring about
the democratic process.
In Sunshine Sketches, “The Candidacy of Mr. Smith” and “The Great Election in
Missinaba County” chronicle the degeneration of an election into a grotesque orgy of wilful
ignorance and self-interest on everyone’s behalf.  In Arcadian Adventures, “The Great Fight for
Clean Government” chronicles the commandeering of an election by the plutocratic class in order
to tighten their grip on public mechanisms of power.  In the century since Leacock wrote these
pervasive critiques, it would seem that—at least at first blush—not much has changed.  If not
much has changed, what are these works telling us about satire’s revolutionary potential?
In the 1960s, two leading satire theorists gave two different answers to this question. 
Robert C. Elliott, Professor of English Literature at the University of California, San Diego, says
in The Power of Satire: Magic, Ritual, Art (1960) that satire is “revolutionary” (275) because
“instead of shoring up foundations, it tears them down” (275).  Leonard Feinberg, Distinguished
Professor of Sciences and Humanities at Iowa State University, says in Introduction to Satire
1
(1967) that satire “cannot have any great influence, for its implied alternative is not very different
from what it is criticizing” (259).  In the half-century since these theorists came to these different
conclusions, studies have brought us only a little closer to determining which opinion is on the
most stable ground.  For example, Frederic Bogel’s The Difference Satire Makes suggests that
satire produces differences and “othering” in society; Jonathan Gray’s Watching with The
Simpsons demonstrates how audience interpretation impacts the meaning of satire; and the
Annenberg Public Policy Center’s “Stephen Colbert’s Civics Lesson” reveals that satire can be a
tool to inform about public policy.  While these and other studies are useful and insightful, they
fail to build a model that can directly test the overarching impasse between Elliott and Feinberg:
is satire revolutionary?  The Revolution Will Not Be Satirised uses the works of Stephen Leacock
in an attempt to answer this question.
The research question “Is satire revolutionary?” will be explored over six chapters. 
Chapter One lays the groundwork for understanding Stephen Leacock’s red tory conservatism, to
introduce the anti-revolutionary thought underlying Leacock’s works.  Chapters Two and Three
construct a theory of satire and a theory of revolution, and then intersect the theories to develop a
specific theory about the revolutionary potential of satire.  Chapters Four and Five outline the
representation of democratic electoral processes in Arcadian Adventures and Sunshine Sketches
in light of these theories of satire and revolution, to understand if Leacock’s satire can be
considered revolutionary.  Chapter Six looks back at the research findings, and then judges
Leacock’s critiques against today’s democratic electoral processes, to consider what—if
anything—about democracy has changed since Leacock wrote Adventures and Sketches.  This
path allows us to question whether satire is revolutionary, or whether satire is simply diagnosing
intractable human conditions. 
Although this research is inspired by Robert Elliott and Leonard Feinberg’s theoretical
impasse regarding the revolutionary potential of satire, it ultimately focuses on Stephen Leacock. 
Leacock’s red tory conservatism sets the stage, Leacock’s works in literary and political theory
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are incorporated into the theoretical framework, and Leacock’s satire is the object of study.  This
is keeping with satire theorist Kirke Combe’s belief that “satire is the product of a particular
person writing at a particular time for a particular audience within a particular society.  If we lose
sight of this, we have lost sight of satire—and perhaps literature as a whole” (74).  Let there be
no mistake that this research will present well-founded ideas that offer guidance for the study of
satire in general.  However, what is being put forth can only be considered conclusive—to
whatever degree any research is conclusive—with regard to Stephen Leacock in general and
Arcadian Adventures and Sunshine Sketches in particular. 
Stephen Leacock: Red Tory, Anti-Revolutionary, Satirist
Understanding Stephen Leacock can begin by introducing his red tory conservatism, and
its relationship to revolution and satire.  Leacock began adult life studying at the University of
Toronto in 1887.  However, financial difficulties forced him to abandon these studies after only
one year.  Uninterested in returning to the family farm where his English family settled when he
was a boy, Leacock sought out teacher certification in Strathroy, Ontario, as a pathway into the
waged world.  He briefly taught in Uxbridge in 1889, before moving to Toronto’s Upper Canada
College.  There, he was able to re-enroll at the University of Toronto and attend classes after the
school day let out.  Upon completing a Bachelor of Arts in 1891, Leacock continued to study
independently, with plans to pursue higher education.  In 1899 he left Upper Canada College to
study at the University of Chicago under Thorstein Veblen, the social critic best known for
identifying conspicuous consumption.  Leacock obtained a lecturer position at McGill University
in 1901, had his PhD conferred and attained professorship at McGill in 1903, and was appointed
the head of McGill’s Department of Political Economy in 1908. 
Leacock’s understandings of classic liberalism and the imperial order established his
reputation as a public intellectual in both Canada and abroad.  These understandings also
underpinned his red toryism, a uniquely Canadian branch of conservatism.  Although political
scientist Gad Horowitz was first to identify red toryism by name in 1966, it can be traced back to
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Canada’s settler foundations.  For understanding Leacock’s relationship with red toryism,
Charles Taylor’s 1980 book Radical Tories is most useful given that Taylor frequently cites
Leacock’s influence on the ideology’s development.  “Unlike the caricatured capitalist,” writes
Taylor, “Canadian conservatives believe in an organic society and the mutual obligations among
all classes.  Which is why... they embrace the principle of social justice and even the welfare
state” (110).  While such a description does not bring the current iteration of the Conservative
Party of Canada to mind, it is a reasonable description of many conservatives of the past, such as
George Grant, Eugene Forsey, and even New Deal-era R.B. Bennett.  It cannot be missed that
George Grant, his father, and his grandfather were all acquainted with Leacock, Eugene Forsey
studied under Leacock, and R.B. Bennett asked Leacock to run for office in 1935, when he cast
off his “iron heel” in favour of ushering in his own New Deal.
Leacock’s red toryism is strongly influenced by Victorian liberal intellectuals such as
John Stuart Mill.  However, conservatives such as Edmund Burke colour Leacock’s thought. 
Burke, an eighteenth-century Anglo-Irish philosopher and parliamentarian, is widely
acknowledged as an essential thinker of modern conservatism.  Burke’s disdain for the disorder
of the French Revolution spawned perhaps his most famous work, Reflections on the Revolution
in France.  Leacock shares with—and perhaps acquired from—Burke the belief that the pursuit
of justice and liberty requires “the need for continuity in human affairs.  But continuity did not
rule out change” (Taylor 73).  Burkean conservatism, like Leacockian red toryism, is not opposed
to change.  It is merely opposed to radical transformation rooted in abstract theoretical
foundations.
The Burkean rejection of radically transformative ideas is captured well by Joseph Stieb,
Ph.D candidate in history at UNC-Chapel Hillover.  Stieb interviewed eight conservative
historians and two conservative political scientists for a Quillette piece, “A Liberal’s Case for
Conservatives in History Departments.”  These conservatives’ observations have tremendous
application to understanding Leacock as both a political theorist and a satirist.  As Stieb recounts, 
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[Independent historian] George Nash told me, “Conservatism tends to see itself as
anti-theory in the sense of abstraction and, in the Burkean sense, skepticism about grand
schemes of interpretation that don’t get down to earth.”  These historians often said that
conservatism gave them a stronger appreciation for what Allen Guelzo, a historian at
Gettysburg College, called the “irony of results” in human affairs and the potential for
defects of human nature to ruin great plans.  They wanted more attention to contingency,
human error, folly, and the limitations of knowledge as causes of events rather than more
leftist emphases on structures of power and economic motives.
Unlike conservatives as Steib sees them, Leacock holds leftist beliefs about the toxicity of
economic motives.  However, Leacock nicely fits into the rest of Steib’s diagnosis.  He holds a
Burkean skepticism about grand ideas, and a conservative belief that human nature produces an
irony of results.  Leacock biographers Theresa and Albert Moritz describe this interplay
especially well:
Leacock developed into a thinker always concerned to encourage change only by setting
the values he found in tradition against current abuses; thus he liked the puncturing of
pious facades and hypocritical motives he found in Veblin as in Marx, but was deeply
suspicious of the radical criticisms and remedies found in their work, grounded in the
theoretical proposals of individual thinkers rather than the slowly broadened wisdom of
an entire people working through its historic institutions.  (88)
When understood this way, it becomes immediately obvious that there is nothing intentionally
revolutionary about Leacock’s politics.  Leacock may not always be pleased with western
political institutions, but he has no desire to actually overthrow them.  
Speaking to Leacock’s red tory desire to fight back the rising socialist tides of the early
twentieth century, he authored several rather polemical attacks on socialist revolution.  Notable
works include Nonsense Novels’ “The Man in Asbestos,” a parodical takedown of Edward
Bellamy’s fictional socialist template Looking Backward; Afternoons in Utopia’s “The Band of
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Brothers,” a lampoon of a failed Marxist revolution that leads society right back to capitalism;
and The Unsolved Riddle of Social Justice, a sometimes hot-headed analysis of social problems
of the 1920s, and why socialism—or at least Bellamy’s version of it—will fail to remedy these
problems.
Leacock’s use of polemics to challenge the validity of socialist revolution is the logical
product of his general conservatism, according to Hannah Arendt.  In On Revolution, Arendt
claims in an endnote that conservatives “have always excelled in polemics, while revolutionaries,
to the extent that they too developed an authentically polemical style, learned this part of their
trade from their opponents” (283).  This leads Arendt to surmise that “conservatism, and neither
liberal nor revolutionary thought, is polemical in origin and indeed almost by definition” (283). 
If conservatism is an argument to preserve the old rather than a proposal for something new, then
Arendt’s position makes perfect sense.  Thus, Leacock’s satire can be understood as distrustful of
grand theories, and aware of the irony of results in implementing these theories.  Little wonder
that, as the University of Ottawa’s Glenn Clever points out, irony is Leacock’s primary method
of humour (128).
Painting Leacock as a Burkean-influenced anti-revolutionary with a bit of a polemical
streak is strikingly consistent with Leonard Feinberg’s observations about satirists.  In
Introduction to Satire, Feinberg says that “there are several reasons why satirists distrust theory. 
For one thing... they are painfully aware of the contradictions between logic and fact” (5).  In the
case of Leacock, Feinberg’s observation applies to both his satirical writings and his writings in
political economy.  Leacock’s distrust of grand theories, his awareness of the irony of results, and
his understanding of the defects of human nature can be traced back at least to his doctoral thesis,
to say nothing of his settler family’s failed Ontario farm.
Leacock’s doctoral thesis, The Doctrine of Laissez Faire, is a survey of laissez faire
thinkers.  It concentrates on the contradictions within the beliefs of these theorists, and the
ironies of how these theories manifest in real-life application.  Leacock’s thesis rejects the idea
6
that the greater welfare of society can be achieved by leaving things alone.  His analysis points
out that laissez faire theorists all prescribe serious qualifications to their theories, so that their
ideas may function in the real world.  Because theoretical qualification is completely contrary to
the very idea of laissez faire, this leaves Leacock to acidly declare, “so much then for the general
principle itself” (Doctrine 58).  
Even though Leacock writes off laissez faire as truism, he accepts—correctly or not—one
grand theory put forth by laissez faire thinkers.  In a 1932 critique of Adam Smith, Leacock
declares that “the classical economists were correct, namely, as to the principle of human
selfishness” (“What is Left” 43).  Because Leacock accepts that individuals are selfish, he
believes that there must be a corrective but not coercive role for the state to ensure social justice
and fairness for the weak in a market-based economy.  As Leacock puts it,
the economists were all wrong in thinking that the pursuit of the individual’s own interest
made for the welfare of all mankind1—Adam Smith’s “invisible hand.”  It does not.  The
welfare of mankind has got to be achieved against it and in spite of it.  But it is an equal
error to have public policy on a system which does not acknowledge and allow for this
individual selfishness.  (“What is Left” 43)
In short, Leacock recognises that individual selfishness cannot be stopped, so while the “vast
mass of human industrial effort must still lie outside the immediate control of the government”
(Unsolved Riddle 142), positive regulation must be used to temper the invisible hand’s
shortcomings.  To leave things alone would lead to the wreck of Adam Smith, and “the wreck of
Adam Smith means the triumph of socialism” (“What is Left” 47).  Given Leacock’s belief that
socialism presented the greatest threat of revolution to the liberal order in the early twentieth
century—notwithstanding some anarchist rumblings and the rise of some powerful fascist
1Gender-excluding language will remain as it appears in the original text.  This generally
keeps with Kirk Combe’s belief about “a particular person writing at a particular time for a
particular audience within a particular society” (74).
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forces—Leacock’s assessment of what would happen if market-based liberal societies collapsed
is likely correct. 
Although Leacock believes the triumph of socialism would be the triumph of “a criminal”
that “feeds upon the wreck of a civilization” (Unsolved Riddle 12), he never entirely dismisses
the concept.  As a red tory, Leacock shares Karl Marx’s belief that the freer the competition, the
more likely it is that the poor and weak will be trampled by the rich and strong (Heritage 54). 
However, Leacock has a serious problem with socialism’s solution to this inequality.  A socialist
society where the means of production are collectively owned is doomed to fail in Leacock’s
mind, because self-interested individuals are predisposed towards maximising their own leisure,
not working for the advancement of the state:
But what?  Such conduct, you say, will not be allowed in the commonwealth.  Idleness
and slovenly, careless work will be forbidden?  Ah!  Then you must mean that beside the
worker will be the overseer with the whip; the time-clock will mark his energy upon its
dial; the machine will register his effort; and if he will not work there is lurking for him in
the background the shadowed door of the prison.  Exactly and logically so.  Socialism, in
other words, is slavery.  (Unsolved Riddle 120-21)  
Leacock’s fear of socialism’s prescription of collective state ownership, but agreement with
socialism’s critique of unrestrained free-market forces, leads him to support it backhandedly:
It is proper, however, to pay to the idea of socialism, not to the practice of it, the tribute
which fittingly belongs to it.  There can be no doubt of the underlying inspiration which
explains its appeal to younger minds, to people entering upon life and cherishing high
ideals.  The notion of all people working together in cheerful comradeship sounds vastly
better, after all, than the stingy maxim, “every man for himself.”  The only difficulty with
socialism... is that it doesn’t yet work; it is too good; if the day ever comes when we are
good enough for such a system, then we shall need no system at all.  (Heritage 56)
As a political economist, Leacock knows that society needs an overarching structural system.  As
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a red tory, Leacock knows that extreme inequality is unjust.  Instead of socialist revolution,
Leacock insists the cure to inequality can and must be found through a fundamentally red tory
position: using the power of existing institutions to correct the shortcomings of laissez faire.  For
Leacock, corrective measures must include minimum wages and reduced work weeks, health
care and financial maintenance for the infirm and the aged, and education and job opportunities
for the young, all paid for through progressive taxation and taxation on accumulated wealth
(Unsolved Riddle 140-43).  Because “only a false mediævalism can paint the past in colors
superior to the present” (Unsolved Riddle 24), Leacock believes change not only can, but must
happen.  In fact, Leacock is convinced that without his prescribed reforms, “no modern state can
hope to survive” (Unsolved Riddle 140).  The key for Leacock is that change must be
implemented through society’s existent structures.
Leacock the Unsavoury Red Tory
To be sure, Leacock’s support for socially-responsible change does not extend beyond
economic reform.  In the realms of gender and race—to say nothing of a few instances leaning
towards anti-Semitism and homophobia—Leacock’s red toryism is decidedly Victorian and
backwards-looking.  Leacock is not singularly oppressive on these fronts, but he is not to be
celebrated.  As historian Margaret MacMillan tells CBC Radio One’s Ideas, “history reminds us
that deeply held beliefs can often be deeply wrong, and they can often be held by very clever,
very powerful people who have sources of all sorts of information and they still get it wrong”
(27:51-28:01).  No doubt this statement applies to Leacock.  However, who is to say it does not
apply to each of us today?  This being the case, it is perhaps self-defeating in the long term to be
singularly absorbed by what people in our past got wrong, lest we wish for our entire body of
work to be judged tomorrow by our handful of failures today.  Leacock may have been a product
of his time, but in one way or another, we all tend to be.  
Nevertheless, there is much to learn from what Leacock got wrong and why he got it
wrong.  Good places to start such learning include Victoria Kuttainen’s Unsettling Stories, in its
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exploration of Leacock’s racial and gendered settler colonial attitudes, particularly in Sunshine
Sketches.  Margaret MacMillan’s Stephen Leacock is also useful, as it is the most critical of the
many Leacock biographies.  Another helpful tool is the Public Legal Education Association of
Saskatchewan’s Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town: The Learning Resource.  Several of its
lessons examine how Sunshine Sketches both portrays and erases Indigenous peoples.  These
resources noted and recommended, this research will take a cue from Jon Gordon.  In “Comic
Heroes and Green Tories,” Gordon acknowledges Leacock’s problematic views, but posits that
“there is more to Leacock than that” (23).  Gordon suggests that we can learn from Leacock in a
way “that need not repeat his racism and sexism” (24).  This research will strive to do much the
same. 
Looking Towards Theory
Leacock’s red toryism is not revolutionary, but this alone does not confirm whether or not
Arcadian Adventures and Sunshine Sketches are revolutionary.  On one hand, Leacock’s politics
verify Feinberg’s contention that the satirist’s implied alternative is not much different than the
system being critiqued.  On the other hand, by pillorying western democracy, Adventures and
Sketches verify Elliott’s contention that satire tears down foundations.  Speaking to Arcadian
Adventures’ power of demolition, Gerald Lynch writes in the Afterword to its 1989 New
Canadian Library version that the Soviet Union translated and published the book “for its
incisive critique of Bourgeois capitalism” (208), though Leacock bibliographer Carl Spadoni has
yet to find definitive proof that such an edition exists (“RE: Arcadian Adventures”).  All of this is
only to say that Leacock’s intentions alone do tell us whether or not his satire is revolutionary. 
To make any definitive determinations about satire’s revolutionary potential thus requires 
deeper understandings of satire and revolution.  What are the specific theoretical components of
satire and revolution?  How do their components interact?  And how exactly do Leacock and his
works fit into ideas of satire and revolution?  These questions will be turned to next.  
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Chapter Two: Towards an Understanding of Satire
Defining satire is a fool’s errand.  Conal Condren’s discussion of satire and definition
makes the point that “a definition at once isolates an essence and provides an idealized form”
(376).  How do we isolate an essence and provide an idealised form of something that theorists
almost universally have come to agree is ill-suited for essentialist definition?  With satire, the
best we can do is search for an understanding.
  The most instructive place to start this search may be what political satire scholar Robert
Phiddian calls “the great age for the theory of satire” (44): the formalist era of the 1950s and
1960s.  This era brought us the likes of Robert C. Elliott and Leonard Feinberg.  In their attempts
to “defend [satire] against a style of reading that threatened to erase the distinction between a
work and its historical context” (Bogel 6), these theorists explored satire’s roots and its
contemporary character.  Like most theorists, they, too, struggled to offer a definition.  In fact,
Elliott’s refusal to define satire in The Power of Satire: Magic, Ritual, Art is more instructive
than any definition could be.  Going only so far as to say that “satire is notoriously a slippery
term” (viii), he suggests that the concept of satire should be dealt with pragmatically rather than
normatively.  His approach, thus, is to use “context and qualifying terms to convey the relevant
sense of satire at any given time” (ix).  Feinberg shares these beliefs.  “The more one studies
satire,” he reflects in Introduction to Satire, “the more likely he is to permit the widest possible
latitude in defining terms” (19).  Even so, Feinberg reluctantly coughs up “a playfully critical
distortion of the familiar” (19) as a working definition for the purposes of his book.
Despite their reluctance to define satire, the two theorists are not afraid to ascribe a
purpose to the satirist.  When considering the familiar field of “real satire” (100, quotation marks
his), Elliott says that the satirist’s purpose is
to expose some aspect of human behavior which seems to him foolish or vicious, to
demonstrate clinically that the behavior in question is ridiculous or wicked or repulsive,
and to try to stimulate in his reader (or in Roman times, his listener) the appropriate
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negative response which prepares the way to positive action.  (111) 
In this, Elliott sees satire as something that is both diagnostic and an instigator of change. 
Feinberg holds a view similar to Elliott about the satirist’s purpose:
[The satirist] serves a function that the realist and romantic do not fulfill, by dramatizing
and exaggerating objectionable qualities in man and society.... Critics repeatedly demand
that satire justify its existence by serving a moral purpose.  Why should it, any more than
any other form of literature?  The test for satire is its success within its prescribed sphere. 
That sphere is criticism of man and society, a criticism made entertaining by humor and
moving by irony and invective.  (ITS 17-18)
Feinberg agrees with Elliott’s contention that the satirist’s purpose is to expose objectionable
traits, specifically vice or folly.  Where Feinberg differs from Elliott is his lesser expectation that
the satirist will be an instigator of change. 
Broadly, Elliott’s and Feinberg’s beliefs about the satirist’s purpose trace back to the
theoretical work of John Dryden, the seventeenth-century English writer and literary critic.  In his
“Discourse concerning the Original and Progress of Satire,” he offers that satire “ought to treat of
one Subject; to be confin’d to one particular theme; or, at least, to one principally” and that “the
poet is bound, and that ex Officio, to give his Reader some one Precept of Moral Virtue; and to
caution him against some particular Vice or Folly” (qtd. in Griffin 19).  Dryden’s words,
according to Dustin Griffin’s Satire: A Critical Reintroduction, “are perhaps the most influential
of all modern pronouncements about satire” (19).  Griffin calls them “the cornerstone for all
subsequent theories of satire’s artfulness and its moral purpose” (20).  Satire shows us what is
not desirable, and elements of this cornerstone are visible throughout Feinberg’s and Elliott’s
works.
Between Feinberg’s definition and Elliott’s lack of definition, and between Elliot’s belief
that satire does and Feinberg’s belief that satire does not need to positively serve a moral
purpose, their theories share one consistency: satire censures, finds fault, and passes
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unfavourable judgment upon the qualities or merits of human actions.  Thus, satire is critique. 
Admittedly, this statement runs dangerously close to isolating an essence and providing an
idealised form.  However, it is not meant to be a reductionist definition of satire, nor is it meant
to diminish any other elements that make up satire.  It is only meant to draw attention to a nearly-
universal observation about the nature of satire.  This observation holds true within the theories
of Feinberg and Elliott, and holds true across the spectrum of contemporary theories of satire.   
Many theorists say outright that satire is critique.  Hermann Real’s “An Introduction to
Satire” states that “satire is a criticism of something” (15).  For Real, “attack is [the satirist’s]
first and foremost, if not his only, business” (12).  John Snyder’s Prospects of Power holds a
similar view, claiming that “satire means to criticize, to aim reason at targets” (95).  Thomas
Jemielity’s Satire and the Hebrew Prophets forthrightly observes that “criticism is always the
content of satire” (85).  And Dustin Griffin believes that satire “may make a radical or even
subversive critique” (159). 
Other theorists do not use the word critique, but they still assert that satire is a form of
provocation or attack.  When satire engages in attack, it keeps with Elliott’s and Feinberg’s belief
that it censures, finds faults, and passes unfavourable judgment: as Feinberg writes in The
Satirist, “the satirist is an attacker rather than a defender.  Criticism functions by exposing the
wrong, rather than praising the right” (253).  To this point, Alvin Kernan’s The Cankered Muse
offers that “satire is synonymous with attack” (7).  Brian Connery and Kirk Combe contend in
Theorizing Satire that satire “emphasizes— indeed is defined by—its intention (attack)” (5). 
And Robert Phiddian says that satire “seeks wittily to provoke an emotional and intellectual
reaction in an audience on a matter of public (or at least inter-subjective) significance” (44). 
Critique or attack is an inescapable feature of satire. 
Stephen Leacock’s books and articles on literary technique never focus at length on the
concept of satire, so his approach is somewhat more difficult to glean.  Nevertheless, he offers
some useful—if at times contradictory—insights into the nature of satire.  Broadly, his insights
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also point towards satire as critique or attack.  In Humor and Humanity, Leacock writes that
“satire may be of a dozen kinds and used for a dozen purposes.  It may be personal, malicious,
diabolical, or political and colourless, just a stick to beat a dog” (188).  Here Leacock seemingly
agrees that satire is ill-suited for essentialist definition.  However, he then complicates matters by
adding, “but humour is the very life of it” (188).  Since not all satire is humour, his addendum is
not accurate.  Understanding this addendum is only further complicated when examining
Leacock’s approach to humour and satire in How to Write.  There, humour is no longer the “very
life” of satire.  Rather, Leacock creates a continuum between humour and satire:
“Good jests,” said King Charles the Second, that most humourous and kindly king who
saved monarchy in England, “ought to bite like lambs, not dogs; they should cut, not
wound.”  The minute they begin to bite and wound that is not humour.  That is satire and
as it gets more and more satirical the humour dries out of it, leaving only the snarl and
rasp of sarcasm.  (186) 
This statement—a contradiction of his earlier assertion that humour is the very life of satire—
may be in some ways Leacock’s more defensible view of satire.  It is consistent with Kernan’s
beliefs about comedy and satire.  “Satire shares with comedy the knowledge that fools and
foolishness have gotten out of hand,” says Kernan, “but it lacks the characteristic balance of
comedy and the tone of amused tolerance which derive from the underlying certainty in comedy
that right reason is ultimately the way of the world” (20).  So long as the potentially problematic
view that comedy and humour are equivalents is taken, there is a commonality between
Leacock’s and Kernan’s words: comedy is gentle, satire is not.  Further, it is worth noting that
neither Leacock nor Kernan delineate exactly where humour and comedy become the bite and
wound of satire.  This ambiguity reinforces Elliott’s belief that satire should be dealt with
pragmatically rather than normatively. 
Even though Leacock does not prescribe a hard line between humour and satire, across
his writings he holds a consistent definition of humour.  In Humor and Humanity, he defines
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humour as “the kindly contemplation of the incongruities of life, and the artistic expression
thereof” (3).  Evidencing his strong belief in humour being something kindly, he cites this very
definition in How to Write.  Claiming that “I think this the best definition I know because I wrote
it myself,” he adds, “students of writing will do well to pause at the word kindly and ponder it
well” (186).  For Leacock, “the fundamental basis... for writing humour is to share in this human
kindliness, to develop to the full extent what native share we have of it, and to look in that
direction for our judgment of our fellow men” (How To Write 187).  Given that Leacock
considers himself primarily a humourist—not a satirist—his works should be understood at least
partly through this lens.  Even so, the simple problem with Leacock’s attempt to anchor humour
to kindliness is that according to Robertson Davies’ biography of Leacock, “humour is a razor,
and even in the most skilled hand it sometimes cuts” (26).  When it comes to kindly ideals,
Sunshine Sketches is a close shave.  Arcadian Adventures has its fair share of nicks.  And one
particular work, the title piece to The Hohenzollerns in America, literally ends in a bloody mess
when the family patriarch is trampled to death. 
As a whole, what can be taken from Leacock’s ramshackle theory is that if he views
humour as “the kindly contemplation of the incongruities of life,” and if he views satire as
humour without the kindly—where the laughs “bite and wound”—then for Leacock satire is a
biting and wounding contemplation of the incongruities of life.  Since it is fair game to equate
biting and wounding to attack and censure, Leacock’s conception of satire can be understood to
be a form of critique. 
Humour, Invective, Irony: The Tools of Satire
If satire is a form of critique, then how specifically does satire accomplish its critique? 
Elliott’s point that satire should be dealt with pragmatically rather than normatively makes
building a framework of satire somewhat difficult if not arbitrary.  That noted, Feinberg points
out that satire’s criticism is “made entertaining by humor and moving by irony and invective” (IS
18).  This statement provides three useful delineations, notwithstanding their lack of mutual
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exclusivity.  Briefly putting aside irony, and with apologies to Frederic Bogel for entertaining
“the long-lived and numbingly reiterated opposition of Juvenalian to Horatian modes of satire”
(29), an exploration of satire’s use of humour and invective makes Horace and Juvenal as good a
place as any to start.  Humour can be most-strongly linked to the satirist Horace (65 - 8 BC);
invective can be most-strongly linked to the satirist Juvenal (c. 1st century - 2nd century). 
For Horace, satire is mockery and playful wit delivered in a plain, common language. 
The satirist is not a prosecutor nor armed with a writ against wicked people.  Laughing at various
forms of nonsense is not done out of malice, because there is no desire to cause pain.  This is not
to say that the mockery and wit serve no function: ridicule, Horace believes, will more effectively
resolve serious issues than severity (Elliott 112-13).  Kernan also holds these views, saying that
Horatian satire “verges on the comic, and their satirists, without losing their cutting-edge, exude
good humor, easy laughter, urbanity” (29).  He helpfully adds Ben Jonson’s words that they
“sport with human follies, not with crimes” (29).  Griffin also agrees, characterising the Horatian
approach as “oblique rather than blunt, smiling and hinting rather than attacking directly” (8). 
Griffin adds that Horace’s satires are marked by “his almost continuous irony, his facetiousness,
his pretending not to be a poet, and his claim that his poems are mere trifles” (8).  His canonical
power indicates that his poems are more than mere trifles.  Even so, Feinberg brings up Frances
T. Russell’s observation that “Horace was honest enough to say that he wrote satire because he
couldn’t write epics.  But from Juvenal on, the satirists claim great moral missions” (TS 25). 
Without doubt, there is a good-spirited element to Horatian satire.
Juvenal is on a moral mission because viciousness and corruption have become dominant
in Rome.  The deplorable state of society renders tragedy and epic irrelevant, because these forms
create heroes in a society where there are none (Kernan 68).  In Juvenal’s eyes, Kernan writes,
Rome is a place where
excessive wealth and foreign customs had sapped the vitality of the Roman stock;
government had been placed in the hands of incompetents, libertines, or despots; [and]
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the functions of citizens had been usurped by clever slaves and freedmen who pursued
their own gain rather than the welfare of the state.  (66) 
This state of affairs leaves Juvenal wanting to bring terror and destruction to his satire’s targets
(Elliott 115-16), hence his invective.  Through lofty and sublime language (Griffin 13), he
critiques using “epic catalogues, sonorous meters, archaisms, Helenisms, weird compounds and
on the other hand... vulgarisms, obscenities, racy colloquialisms, [and] technical terminology”
(Kernan 76).  With a righteous anger rife with civic indignation, Juvenalian satire takes a clear
and consistent moral point of view.  
Elliott perhaps best-contrasts these two forms of satire when he proposes that “Horatian
satire seeks to displace the social mask by the flick of laughter; Juvenalian satire would cleanse a
rotten society in the fire of its hate” (115).  Though not perfectly delineated, it is easy to see how
Sunshine Sketches can be slotted into a Horatian tradition, while Arcadian Adventures can find
itself nudging into the Juvenalian tradition.  Sketches’ Mariposa is the Canadian town that
Leacock loves.  Adventures’ Plutoria is the American metropolis that Leacock loathes.  
Sunshine Sketches keeps with the “chatty, digressive, easily led from one topic to
another” (Griffin 22) nature of Horatian satire, as its gently ironic narrator meanders through the
lives of Mariposans.  “Leacock tried very hard,” claims Robertson Davies, “to keep his Sunshine
Sketches sunny” (21).  By and large, he succeeds.  Guy Vanderhaeghe says that “in no other of
his works does his gentle humour illuminate human idiosyncrasy with a steadier light, or does the
pathos he evokes seem so much a natural outcome of our human journey” (21).  Heinz Antor
holds a similar view, noting that Sketches “presents a mellower world of social cohesion and
order, and the foibles of the Mariposans can be viewed with ironic amusement” (54).  And
Gerald Noonan says “the narrator is determined to enjoy life on its own terms even though he is
unrelentingly aware of its many inconsistencies” (916).  Undoubtedly, Sketches’ critique exposes
foolishness, but as Horatian satire stipulates, there is no desire to cause pain.  For that matter,
Leacock’s lifetime of interpersonal kindness and humanity—from setting up a diphtheria camp
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on his estate to house a contagious boy no longer wanted in Orillia (McKim) to employing locals
with his own make-work projects during the Depression (Anderson 147)—cannot be looked at
with the conclusion being that Leacock found pleasure in seeing or bringing pain, especially to
his thinly-veiled friends and neighbours who make up the satiric targets in Sunshine Sketches of a
Little Town.  He knows these people.  He likes these people.  There is something Horatian going
on in Leacock’s critique.
However, the sunny but ironic nature of Sunshine Sketches leads to questions of whether
or not it is actually satire.  To be sure, Desmond Pacey declares it a satire, though one that is
“very mild and gentle” (216), as does Vincent Sharman who tests the book against Kernan’s
theories and concludes it is a “mock utopian” and “mock heroic” (262) that exposes “the severity
of the limits of the human condition and the futility... of trying to escape or to forget them” (267). 
But there are other opinions.  Claude Bissell says Sketches is humour (39).  Glenn Willmott pegs
the book as sublime humour (56-61), the Leacockian concept that humour mixes with pathos to
provide a “prolonged and sustained conception of the incongruities of life itself” (“American
Humor” 92).  Willmott anchors his claim in J. Kushner and R.D. Macdonald’s theory that
Sketches represents a political-economic ideal for Leacock: “The political register of Sunshine
Sketches,” reiterates Willmott, “may be closer to a cliched capitalist fantasy than to a satirical
critique or utopian plea” (50).  Donald Cameron views Sketches as irony (261), a position greatly
expanded upon by Gerald Lynch who—while acknowledging its satiric barbs—claims that “the
narrator’s ambivalence in the Sketches make that book a masterpiece, and not a minor one, of
ironic humour” (Humour and Humanity 122).  As can be seen, there is a wide array of opinions
on whether or not the humour and irony in Sunshine Sketches amount to satire.
All of the above positions have merit within their frames of analysis.  However, satire is
more a mode than a genre (Phiddian 44, Bogel 52), and this mode infects other forms (Griffin 3). 
As Connery and Combe point out, “often, satire’s habituation of other forms is so successful that
it is mistaken for those forms” (5).  Because satire is something of a chimera, a few key points
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about the debate on whether or not Sketches is satire must be made.  First, irony and humour are
tools of satire, so Sketches’ strengths in displaying these traits does not necessarily exclude the
book from the realm of satire.  Second, as compelling as the Kushner-Macdonald theory may be
to those who are versed in Leacock’s political writings—and it is a compelling argument—this
stance does not confront the reality that most satirists are conservatives (Elliott 266, Feinberg IS
256), nor does it negate the possibility that Sketches satirises shortcomings of human nature that
appear within Leacock’s ideal community.  Third, because Leacock believes there is a continuum
between humour and satire, sublime humour can function as satire.  Such debate about whether
or not Sketches is satire nicely illustrates Feinberg’s perhaps obvious point that “even intelligent
readers of satire sometimes reach conflicting interpretations” (IS 265).  There are going to be
varied opinions about the satirical nature of Sunshine Sketches.
The numerous opinions about Sunshine Sketches acknowledged, the book simply has too
many consistencies with satire theory to definitively exclude it from the realm of satire,
especially satire of the Horatian variety.  Its mild mockery and playful wit—delivered in a plain,
common language—come together to provide what is almost undeniably a societal critique that
exposes foolish behaviour.  There is an intimate and accessible tone of the narrator: “Oh, pshaw! 
I was not talking about a steamer sinking in the ocean and carrying down its screaming crowds of
people into the hideous depths of green water.  Oh, dear me, no!” (56).  The narrator engages in
trifling self-degradation: “To a humble intellect like mine he would explain in full the relations
of the Keesar to the German Rich Dog” (32).  The book is almost-continuous irony: “he... closed
down the infant class for forty-eight hours so that Teddy Moore should not miss the pleasure of
flying [the kite], or rather seeing it flown.  It is foolish to trust a Chinese kite to the hands of a
young child” (63).  Finally, Sketches emphasises human follies, not crimes: “a grave man with a
white tie, who put his whole heart into the work and would take nothing for it except his
expenses and a sum of money for each speech.  But beyond the money, I say, he would take
nothing” (144).  Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town hits all the necessary registers of satire.
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Arcadian Adventures with the Idle Rich, on the other hand, is universally agreed to be
satire.  In suggesting that it drifts into Juvenalian territory, it is important to remember that, as
Kernan points out,
to describe the formal characteristics of Juvenalian satire is to describe those of Horatian
satire as well.  Horace, using to an unknown degree the earlier satiric writings of Lucilius
and Ennius, had stabilized the form of Roman satire, and both Juvenal and Persius,
though they abandoned the mild Horatian tone, worked within the Horatian forms.  (64-
65)
Arcadian Adventures envelops concepts of Horatian satire in its fulfilment of the Juvenalian
form, but there is no question that Adventures is satire.  Heinz Antor nails down the book as
“satirizing in a harsher, sharper tone the destructive and hypocritical activities of the plutocracy
of a big capitalist American city” (54).  Davies calls Adventures “this very angry book” (30), and
though speaking in more general terms about Leacock notes that “there is sometimes also a
Juvenalian tinge to his satire.  The latter, however, never deteriorates into sarcasm because it is
softened by pathos and compassion” (55).  And Lynch says that “Leacock’s more militant irony
in the Adventures makes it the work of a satirist, albeit a relatively kindly and humanistic one”
(Humour and Humanity 122), thus speaking to Leacock’s underlying sense of humanity.  
Even with Leacock’s pathos, the deplorable state of Plutorian society gives a Juvenalian
tinge to the satire of Arcadian Adventures.  Excessive wealth and foreign customs sap the vitality
of the Plutorian stock: “Near by is a child of four, in a khaki suit, who represents the merger of
two trunk line railways” (7-8).  Government is in the hands of incompetents, libertines, or
despots: “the grave faces of manly bondholders flushed with pride and the soft eyes of listening
shareholders laughed back in joy.  For they had no doubt or fear, now that clean government had
come” (202-03).  The functions of citizens are usurped by freedmen who pursue their own gain
rather than the welfare of the state: “People began to realise the needs of the city as they never
had before.  Mr. Boulder, who owned, among other things, a stone quarry and an asphalt
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company, felt that the paving of the streets was a disgrace” (189).  It is clear that Arcadian
Adventures with the Idle Rich exhibits a clear and consistent righteous anger, its invective often
masked by humour but rife with civic indignation.
Sitting on an ostensibly Horatian/Juvenalian divide, both books lay out their critiques by
relying heavily upon Feinberg’s third tool of satire: irony.  Verbal irony, as defined by literary
theorist Meyer Howard Abrams, is “a statement in which the meaning that a speaker implies
differs sharply from the meaning that is ostensibly expressed” (135).  Abrams traces irony back
to its conceptual Greek origins:
In Greek comedy the character called the eiron was a “dissembler,” who characteristically
spoke in understatement and deliberately pretended to be less intelligent than he was, yet
triumphed over the alazon—the self-deceiving and stupid braggart....  In most of the
critical uses of the term “irony” there remains the root sense of dissembling or hiding
what is actually the case; not, however, in order to deceive, but to achieve special
rhetorical or artistic effects.  (134-35)
Even if the intention of irony is rhetorical and not deceptive, as Abrams believes, Bogel points
out that “ambiguity, with the interpretive uncertainty that accompanies it, is an intrinsic feature of
irony” (67).  The ambiguity of irony has led to a tendency to categorise irony as either stable or
unstable (Bogel 67).  According to Bogel, stable irony provides “instances where we think we are
reasonably sure that we know the intent of the irony” (67).  Stable irony allows for easy
comprehension of its surface ambiguity.  “Once a reconstruction of meaning has been made,”
says Wayne C. Booth in A Rhetoric of Irony, “the reader is not then invited to undermine it with
further demolitions and reconstructions” (6).  Perhaps this is why is easier to see Arcadian
Adventures as bona fide satire.  Adventures’ irony is relatively stable because its broader targets
are easily identifiable: Leacock held a nearly lifelong belief that narrow individualism would lead
western society to social catastrophe (see 1903’s “Doctrine,” 1907’s Elements, 1920’s Unsolved
Riddle, 1932’s “What is Left,” and 1944’s Our Heritage).  
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On the other hand, the irony of Sunshine Sketches is unstable.  Unstable irony rests on the
premise that negation begins all ironic play (Booth 244), so “the clear implication [is] that since
the universe (or at least the universe of discourse) is inherently absurd, all statements are subject
to ironic undermining” (Booth 241).  Everything is up for interpretation with unstable irony.
Because Leacock “is having fun, but it is fun with something he loves—the life, in all its
patterned variety, of a little Ontario town he knows with easy and perfect intimacy” (Carr x), and
because Leacock subscribes to a Burkean concept of conservatism that espouses “an organic
society and the mutual obligations among all classes” (Taylor 110), it can be sometimes more
difficult to understand how Leacock can at once be both amiable to his satiric targets and critique
shortcomings of their human nature.  This multifaceted nature of Sketches’ irony leaves us with a
book in which “the decision about which kind of reading is called for is seldom easy and
sometimes impossible” (Booth 245).  Nevertheless, “wherever there are intentions, however
obscure or unconventional, there are invitations to interpret” (Booth 245): Leacock had intentions
in writing Sunshine Sketches and there is a whole library of literature attempting to interpret these
intentions.  Fortunately, interpreting Sketches’ irony does not always need to hinge upon third-
party interpretations and reader-constructed meanings.  Leacock’s numerous writings on political
economy provide many useful anchor points for interpreting Sketches’ unstable irony. 
Nevertheless, all that can be said with certainty is that because Sketches is a masterpiece of irony,
the often-contradictory analyses of it nicely illustrate the “interpretive uncertainty” (Bogel 67)
that accompanies irony. 
Because, as Bogel points out, irony is “one of the literary techniques that lend [sic]
indirectness and artifice to the element of attack and thus redeem satire from charges of mere
aggression” (66), it is an ideal tool for a satirist with a gentle disposition such as Leacock.  Irony
allows him to expose foolishness, wickedness, or viciousness with an invective and humour that
does not completely degenerate into the rasp of sarcasm.  This is true for a Juvenalian satire like
Arcadian Adventures and true for a Horatian satire like Sunshine Sketches. 
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What does Satire’s Critique Accomplish?
When satire critiques, what does its critique accomplish?  In asking this question, it is
useful to first return to the theories of Elliott and Feinberg.  Their divergence on what satire can
accomplish is stark.  For Elliott, satire is revolutionary.  For Feinberg, it is not. 
Recall that Elliott says satire should “prepare the way for positive action” (111).  In
making this claim, Elliott is setting the table to establish satire as revolutionary.  This belief in
satire as revolutionary is most intriguing given Elliott’s belief that a majority of satire is
conservative.  Satire accepts and operates under the established framework of a society, says
Elliott (266, 273).  As such it tends not to attack society’s framework but rather attacks
perversions of the framework’s institutions (271).  For Elliott, satire undermines through
synecdoche: for example, when the corrupt judge is attacked, that judge comes to stand for the
law itself (272), thus undermining the entire legal system.  Consequently, even if predominantly
conservative, satire is “revolutionary” (275) because “the pressure of [the satirist’s] art works
directly against the ostensibly conservative function which it is said to serve.  Instead of shoring
up foundations, it tears them down” (274-75). 
Feinberg agrees with Elliott on the ideological front.  While he claims in The Satirist that
there are radical, conservative, liberal, and reactionary satirists (252), he too holds in both The
Satirist and An Introduction to Satire that most satirists are conservatives whose critiques focus
on the surface of society.  As such, they fail to foundationally question the political and economic
structures of society (ITS 256, TS 253).  Feinberg also shows some agreement with Elliott on
satire’s potential for instigating change, insofar as Feinberg believes that satire holds the
potential to change the actions of individual targets (ITS 260).  But unlike Elliott, Feinberg never
calls satire revolutionary.  Feinberg suggests that “[w]hen a satirist is in tune with his time and
expresses popular dissatisfaction, he may give the impression that he is influencing events. 
Usually, however, he is a symptom, not a cause” (ITS 256).  This means satire “cannot have any
great influence, for its implied alternative is not very different from what it is criticizing” (ITS
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259).  Satire is not revolutionary but rather a conservative reaction to surrounding events.
Of these two positions, Feinberg’s resignation about satire’s potential to instigate change
shows that his personal attitude is much like the general disposition of satirists.  “The satirist,”
writes Feinberg, “is likely to be skeptical about most social institutions” (TS 253).  There is a
shared skepticism between Burkean conservatism of the eighteenth century and satire, and Bogel
traces this skepticism back further to the seventeenth century.  He believes that “the structure of
rhetorical relations in satire... is deeply connected with a particular skepticism about the
possibility of radical historical change that grows up in the period between the English Civil
Wars and the Glorious Revolution” (19).  Leacock’s admiration for King Charles II directly links
him to the historical relations between satirists and skepticism that Bogel is talking about.  
In Leacock’s laudatory “A Rehabilitation of Charles II,” Leacock touches on the futility
of instigating radical change.  He says that the king “possessed in an eminent degree that
largeness of view, that breadth of mental vision which sees things in their true perspective.  He
had grasped as but few men have done the great truth that nothing really matters very much”
(274).  What Leacock goes on to say about humanity is not only relevant to the skeptical nature
of Leacock the satirist, but also offers explanation for why Leacock’s satire seldom becomes a
full-on Juvenalian moral mission.  It is worth reading in its entirety:
[Charles II] was able to see that the burning questions of to-day become the forgotten
trifles of yesterday, and that the eager controversy of the present fades into the litter of the
past.  To few it has been given to see things as they are, to know that no opinion is
altogether right, no purpose altogether laudable, and no calamity altogether deplorable. 
To carry in one’s mind an abiding sense of the futility of human endeavour and the
absurdity of human desire is a sure protection against the malignant narrowness that
marks the men endowed with fixed convictions and positive ideas.  For the same reason it
is found that the man of real enlightenment is inevitably reckoned a trifler and is accused
of shallowness and insincerity, while a dull man heavily digesting his few ideas is
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credited with a profundity which he does not possess.  (274-75)
If Leacock believes that no opinion is altogether right and no purpose altogether laudable, he
surely must include his own opinions and purposes in this assessment.  Hence his reluctance to
enter into Juvenalian moral missions when undertaking fiction, lest he becomes what he has set
out to critique.  Unlike Jonathan Swift’s oft-quoted condemnation that “satire is a sort of glass,
wherein beholders do generally discover everybody’s face but their own,” when Leacock asks in
Nonsense Novels “do you ever look at your face in the glass?” the answer—albeit in a work of
fiction—is “I do” (80). 
Perhaps satire—especially Leacock’s satire—is underpinned by belief and disbelief:
belief that all views are fragile and disbelief that radical change is possible.  Leacock himself
meets this criteria.  His belief that no opinion is altogether right is coupled with his disbelief in
the possibility of radical change: prior to Russia’s October Revolution, Leacock was convinced
that a socialist revolution was not coming.  If satire is underpinned by a dichotomy of belief and
disbelief, it lends credence to a notion that satire’s critique is not meant to be prescriptive, but
rather meant to explore positions and topics.  Feinberg opens this possibility by suggesting that as
a form that attacks the certainty of our knowledge (271), satire “may also provide a fresh
perspective, detachment, or balance” (261).  Griffin finds himself in a similar realm, observing
that “what we behold in satire is not a neatly articulated homiletic discourse but the drama of an
inflamed sensibility, or a cool and detached mind playfully exploring a moral topic” (37-38).  If
exploring the implications of a moral topic is a task of satire’s critique, then Bogel is quite right
to add to Griffin’s observation that “as a result, readers are also engaged in exploring the
question of what it means to take a position at all” (62).  Satire seems to be more exploratory
than prescriptive.
Nevertheless, even if satire’s critique is meant to be exploratory, then it must be
acknowledged that many satires contain a prescriptive element.  But the problem with satire’s
prescriptive element is that theorists almost universally believe it is not significant.  Elliott points
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to Mary Claire Randolph’s unpublished doctoral dissertation to drive home this point.  Randolph
finds that Roman formal verse satire has critical and prescriptive elements: “[in] Part A, the satire
attacks a specific vice or folly (sometimes, to the pain of purists, vices or follies) and in Part B
recommends an opposing virtue” (Elliott 110).  However, Elliott emphasises that “the two parts
are disproportionate in length and in importance, for the satirist has always been more disposed
to castigate wickedness than to exhort to virtue” (110).  Bogel also looks at Randolph’s work,
conceding that “satire—however implicitly—makes positive recommendations” (56).  The key
word in Bogel’s assessment is implicitly.  Griffin examines the prescriptive elements in satire
from Horace to Swift and concludes that they “do not serve as hortatory models or as blueprints
for social engineers; instead, they teasingly hold up an ideal that cannot be obtained” (61). 
Connery and Combe say that “although a few utopian satirists are noted for construction rather
than destruction, their materials are often criticized as insubstantial” (1).  Kernan believes that
kernels of an ideal can be found in satire, but “this ideal is never heavily stressed....
Consequently, every effort is made to emphasize the destroying ugliness and power of vice” (11). 
Ruben Quintero says in A Companion to Satire that the satirist “either explicitly or implicitly,
tries to sway us toward an ideal alternative, toward a condition of what the satirist believes
should be” but concludes that “the satirist is not obligated to solve what is perceived as a
problem or replace what is satirically disassembled or unmasked with a solution” (3).  Feinberg
agrees, noting that even if satire has “some vaguely positive ideal” embedded within, “the ideal
itself is rarely offered openly as an alternative” (TS 280).  And even Leacock himself, though
speaking of humour, says that what we have on our hands is “essentially a comforter, reconciling
us to the things as they are in contrast to things as they ought to be” (Garden of Folly ix).  At
best, whatever prescriptive offering satire has is obscured by its overwhelming urge to critique. 
Satirists tend to not be in the construction business.
None of this is to say there is no ideal underpinning satire.  It is only to say that—just as
Real points out—whatever that ideal may be, it is hiding behind the satirist’s words (15): the
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humour, the invective, the irony.  In lieu of a prescription, Connery and Combe suggest that
satire offers “open-endedness, irresolution, and thus chaos.  Closure, in most cases, would turn a
narrative satire into either comedy or tragedy and thus contradict the satirist’s representation of
evil as a present and continuing danger” (5).  Satire’s aversion to closure lends credence to
Kernan’s belief that “whenever satire does have a plot which eventuates change, it is not true
change but simply intensification of the original condition” (31).  The problems presented in
satire are only made worse by the work’s closing.  This intensification of the original condition is
marked, as Connery and Combe claim, by a “low view of human nature” (3).  This leaves no
other option than to conclude that satire is not a place for ideals or closure.  Satire is a place for
critique.
Concluding that satire is critique—and a seemingly misanthropic one at that—creates a
wrinkle for believers such as Elliott who say that satire is revolutionary.  Elliott tells us that satire
is revolutionary not because it offers ideals but because satire undermines and tears down
foundations.  But when satire tears an institution down, it does not prescribe a replacement: it
merely creates a void.  How can it be certain that the void satire creates will be filled in a
revolutionary manner?  To answer this question, the concept of revolution will be turned to next. 
What are the requirements for something to be revolutionary?  Does satire’s critique in and of
itself fill these revolutionary requirements?  The following chapter will examine the concept of
revolution, with a goal of understanding how it fits into satire as a form of critique.
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Chapter Three: Towards an Understanding of Revolution
Debating revolution is a losing battle.  Isaac Kramnick’s discussion of revolution and
definition makes the point that “revolutionaries, much to the dismay of their sympathizers, have
usually devoted as much time and energy debating the nature of revolution as they have in efforts
to bring one about” (26).  Despite the opportunity cost, debate is a reasonable path to take.  It
would be lunacy to launch a revolution without knowing what we are fighting against, what we
are fighting for, and how we are going to get there.  And so this debate will consume more time
and energy.  Por ahora.2
Curiously, a debate about the nature of revolution is not far removed from a debate about
the nature of satire.  Recall that Robert C. Elliott believes we should use “context and qualifying
terms to convey the relevant sense of satire at any given time” (ix).  Similarly, James Farr’s
“Historical Concepts in Political Science: The Case of ‘Revolution’” states that context and
qualifying terms are required to convey the relevant sense of revolution at any given time:
A historical concept is either one whose scope is temporally restricted to a specific
historical period or one whose meaning is mutable and changes along with the changing
practices and beliefs of political agents.  “Revolution” is an example of the latter, though
characteristically it is connected with the former.  (689)  
Though Farr lacks the brevity of Elliott, he makes the same point.  “Revolution” is a mutable and
changing word, just as “satire” gains its definitions through qualification.  Hence, both terms are
fluid and thus ill-suited for essentialist definition. 
In “Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory,” Jack Goldstone provides a
2 Before Hugo Chávez’s 1998 electoral victory in Venezuela, he led a failed 1992 coup
d’état.  In his nationally-televised surrender speech, Chávez told Venezuelans that the Bolivarian
movement had failed “por ahora,” for now.  At this point, por ahora entered the revolutionary
vernacular.  For revolutionary supporters, it is a beacon of hope.  For establishment supporters, it
is an ominous warning. 
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possible explanation for the problem of revolution being ill-suited for essentialist definition. 
“The study of revolutions,” Goldstone observes, “may be reaching an impasse at which it is
simply overwhelmed by the variety of cases and concepts it seeks to encompass” (140).  While
Goldstone’s assessment is likely correct, his frustration is nothing new.  As the title of his work
suggests, three generations of revolutionary theory precede him.  And each of these generations
suffers from definitional problems.  In States and Social Revolutions, third-generation theorist
Theda Skocpol points out the difficulties in honing a singular definition of revolution.  Because
“we must look at revolutions as wholes, in much of their complexity” (5), Skocpol finds that
there are “enormous disagreements” (12) about their nature and definition.  Second-generation
theorist Chalmers Johnson acknowledges in Revolutionary Change that revolution is an “elusive
concept” (1).  And the father of modern revolution theorists, Crane Brinton, throws up his hands
at the beginning of The Anatomy of Revolution.  His magnum opus opens with the admission that
“revolution is one of the looser words” (3).  Even some revolutionaries share this frustration. 
Marx and Engels’ intellectual and political heir Karl Kautsky believes that “few things are so
ambiguous” (5) as revolution.  
Of the revolutionaries and theorists who seemingly surrender instead of providing an
essentialist definition of revolution, Hannah Arendt best-captures this problem.  Her canonical
On Revolution prescribes “The Meaning of Revolution,” but it takes 14,000 words to do so. 
Nevertheless, Arendt’s exploration of the meaning of revolution is noteworthy for recounting the
term’s history and semantical oddities.  The term has celestial beginnings, first appearing in the
late fourteenth century to describe how heavenly objects return to an original point.  These
celestial beginnings gave revolution a restorative meaning, one that began to be applied to
political events in the sixteenth century.  When a political cycle returned to where it began, it was
a revolution.  For example, in 1640 England became engulfed in civil war, Charles I was
overthrown, and a republic was established.  Arendt tells us that these events became a
“revolution” not when Charles I was overthrown, but rather when Charles II restored the
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monarchy in 1660 (43).  It was Leon Trotsky who later re-branded the overthrow of Charles I as a
contemporary “revolution.”  Revolution as the establishment of a new political beginning—not a
restoration of the old—does not become the word’s common acceptance until the eighteenth
century.  In fact, Arendt pegs an exact date: July 14, 1789.  Following the storming of the Bastille
in Paris, Louis XVI asks “c’est une revolte?”  He is told “non, Sire, c’est une revolution” (47).
Arendt’s overview is historically interesting, but it brings us little closer to settling on a
definition of revolution.  Fortunately—and despite the oft-stated ambiguity of the term—there
are many definitions circling about.  Revolution’s most-widely cited definition is by Skocpol. 
She says revolutions are “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures;
and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below” (4).  In
coming to this definition, Skocpol admits to “rely extensively upon certain ideas adapted from
the Marxist and political-conflict perspective” (13).  Chalmers Johnson declines to offer his own
definition of revolution.  Instead, he says that all the elements of revolution are found in Arthur
Bauer’s 1908 definition, “les changements tentés ou réalisés par la force dans la constitution des
sociétiés” (1), the changes attempted or made by force in the constitution of societies.  Crane
Brinton, despite having thrown up his hands in The Anatomy of Revolution, defines revolution
for the purposes of his book: “drastic, sudden substitution of one group in charge of the running
of a territorial political entity by another group hitherto not running that government” (4).  He
further adds that “the revolutionary substitution of one group for another, if not made by actual
violent uprising, is made by coup d’etat, Putsch, or some other kind of skulduggery” (4).  
Stephen Leacock’s works in political economy also address the concept of revolution. 
However, nowhere does Leacock explicitly define revolution nor does he focus at length on
revolution as a broader theoretical concept.  Leacock’s most theoretical approach to revolution is
in Elements of Political Science.  There he considers the events of the French Revolution to be a
loose reflection of Aristotle’s cycle of governments in Politics: monarchy, tyranny, aristocracy,
oligarchy, polity, and lastly democracy (113).  In Leacock’s conservative mind, this cycle “cannot
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be argued... as a necessary or even as a normal course of political change” (115).  When Leacock
talks revolution in other works, he usually is pillorying the concept of a socialist society run by “a
board of elected officials, generally pictured as wise old men, if need be with flowing beards”
(Heritage 55).  For Leacock, revolutionaries are to be ridiculed, not defined. 
However, in The Unsolved Riddle of Social Justice, Leacock does come deliciously close
to providing a definition of revolution.  Describing the Russian Revolution as an “infection,” he
writes,
All over the world the just claims of organized labor are intermingled with the
underground conspiracy of social revolution.  The public mind is confused.  Something
approaching to a social panic appears.  To some minds the demand for law and order
overwhelms all other thoughts.  To others the fierce desire for social justice obliterates all
fear of a general catastrophe.  They push nearer and nearer to the brink of the abyss.  The
warning cry of “back” is challenged by the eager shout of “forward!”  The older methods
of social progress are abandoned as too slow.  The older weapons of social defense are
thrown aside as too blunt.  Parliamentary discussion is powerless.  It limps in the wake of
the popular movement.  The “state”, as we knew it, threatens to dissolve into labor
unions, conventions, boards of conciliation, and conferences.  Society shaken to its base,
hurls itself into the industrial suicide of the general strike, refusing to feed itself, denying
its own wants.  (12-13)
While this passage is Leacock writing at a particular time for a particular audience—post-
Russian-Revolution North America—it is quite possible to glean a definition of revolution from
Leacock’s words.  Leacock sees revolution as a struggle for rapid societal transformation that
rejects actualising change through traditional and parliamentary methods.
These definitions of revolution from Leacock and from revolution theorists may not be
precisely the same, but they all share a commonality: revolution involves a dramatic structural
change of governance.  But this statement does not fully capture the concept.  Given that Jack
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Goldstone surveys all the above literature (sans Leacock) and more, it is helpful to turn back to
him for a clarified and refined definition of revolution.  In examining hundreds of events
characterised as revolutionary, Goldstone finds that they share three elements:
(a) efforts to change the political regime that draw on a competing vision (or visions) of a
just order, 
(b) a notable degree of informal or formal mass mobilization, and 
(c) efforts to force change through noninstitutionalized actions such as mass
demonstrations, protests, strikes, or violence.  (142)
These three observations lead Goldstone to attempt his fourth-generation definition of revolution. 
Revolution is “an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political
authority in a society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and
noninstitutionalized actions that undermine existing authorities” (142).  This definition nicely
envelops the four previously-cited definitions of revolution, providing an idea of what to look for
when labelling something revolutionary.  
Does Goldstone’s definition allow satire to be labelled revolutionary?  At least at first
glance, there is a case to be made: satire’s critique appears to be a noninstitutionalised action that
undermines existing authorities.  Therefore, satire finds itself under the umbrella of   Goldstone’s
definition of revolution.  That said, fitting under Goldstone’s definitional umbrella of non-
institutionalised action is not enough to declare satire revolutionary.  Noninstitutionalised action,
Goldstone says, is only an accompaniment to revolution.  Revolution itself is defined by
Goldstone as an “effort to transform the political institutions and justifications for political
authority in society.”  If satirists are most often conservatives, then it is highly doubtful that they
are engaged in an effort to actually transform institutions and justifications for authority: as
already established, even pro-revolutionary Elliott believes that the satirist’s effort is not to
criticise society’s framework.  Rather, the satirist’s effort is to attack perversions of the
framework’s institutions.  If satire’s effort is couched in the defence of existing societal
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institutions, it is not revolutionary under Goldstone’s definition.  It may critique, but it does not
advocate for political transformation. 
Goldstone’s definition provides a prima facie case that satire is not revolutionary. 
However, this is not the place to close the books.  If the rejection of satire as revolutionary is
hinged upon it being the wrong kind of effort, the rejection needs to do more than just repeat
claims about the conservative nature of satirists.  That said, there is no need to plunge into the
rabbit hole of authorial intention to make the case.  Rather, the case that satire is not
revolutionary can be made by better-establishing what exactly drives a revolutionary effort. 
The Theory of Revolution
The three established generations of revolution theory offer many ideas about what drives
a revolution.  Each generation varies, and no generation has proven itself definitive.  Thus, Farr’s
conclusion that “no truly general or ahistorical theory of revolution is possible” (690) can be
accepted.  Nevertheless, a focussed introduction to each generation is useful in any attempt to
build a broader understanding of revolution and its convergence with the theory of satire.  For
each generation, the broader generational theme will first be outlined, and then one of its leading
theorists will be honed in on.  Specifically, understandings of two things will be built:
1.  How does each generation and one of its leading theorists verify or nullify Elliott’s
belief that satire is revolutionary because it tears down foundations? 
2.  How does each generation and one of its leading theorists verify or nullify Feinberg’s
belief that satire is incapable of sparking a major societal reorganisation? 
In doing this, the common elements of each generation that are relevant to understanding satire’s
revolutionary potential will be woven together.
The Masses Do Not Make Revolutions: Crane Brinton and the First Generation.  
First-generation revolutionary theory appears in the 1920s and 1930s.  Theories of this
generation—such as Lyford P. Edwards’ The Natural History of Revolution (1927), Crane
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Brinton’s The Anatomy of Revolution (1934), and George Sawyer Pettee’s The Process of
Revolution (1938)—tend to borrow scientific methods of observation to create descriptive
analyses.  As John Foran puts it in “Theories of Revolution Revisited,” these theorists
“developed elaborate descriptions of the stages of some of the major social revolutions up to
their day (often surprisingly accurate for later events as well) without a clear theory of why
revolutions occurred or what accounted for their outcomes” (2).  Brinton’s work, as the most-
cited of this generation, deserves elaboration.  
The Anatomy of Revolution is a comparative analysis of the French, English, Russian, and
American Revolutions.  Brinton warns that each revolution has several unique variables at play
(226), complicating theoretical generalisation.  Nevertheless, he traces revolutions through a five-
step process: the structural weaknesses of and discontent with old regimes, the fever of
revolution, the accession of extremist authorities, the reaction to new extremists, and finally the
restoration of stable power structures.  In these processes, he observes certain consistencies
across revolutions that are relevant to the theory of satire.  
One of the consistencies that Brinton observes is widespread discontent with the existent
regime in the years preceding a revolution (79).  This discontent manifests itself as “a crescendo
of protests against the tyranny of the government, a hail of pamphlets, plays, addresses, an
outburst of activity on the part of interested pressure groups” (68).  No doubt the hailstorm of
discontent would include satire.  As Feinberg reminds us, many scholars believe that “great
periods of historical change have always been marked by a flowering of satire” (quoting Edgar
Johnson, TS 302).  Pre-revolutionary times are satirical times.  
The flowering of satire during pre-revolutionary periods of discontent suggests that there
is a similarity between revolutionaries and satirists.  In fact, just as Brinton points out that
“clearly a man who takes part in a revolution before it is demonstrably successful is a
discontented man” (106), Feinberg points out that there is evidence to suggest that “the satirist is
a maladjusted, abnormal personality type” (350).  That the satirist is maladjusted and the early
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revolutionary is discontented makes for a notable convergence, but it cannot be tabled as
conclusive evidence that satire is revolutionary.  In a state with pre-revolutionary conditions,
Brinton points to something else going on that warrants examination in light of the similarity
between satirists and revolutionaries.  One of “the most reliable of the symptoms” of a society in
a pre-revolutionary state, says Brinton, is “the transfer of allegiance of the intellectuals” (251). 
Clearly, authors in general and Leacock in particular can be included amongst the intellectuals. 
As members of the intellectual class, satirists would then not be alone in their critique of the
status quo.  While there is no rule that says intellectuals reflect the popular will, their output must
reflect—at least in part—the accepted wisdom that they have heard echoing inside academia. 
Perhaps, then, even if satire is ahead of popular opinion, its flowering in pre-revolutionary times
is not so much leading edge as it is reflective of attitudes inside intellectual circles.  
Brinton’s thoughts about the intellectuals of his time and their revolutionary potential
deserve brief consideration.  After all, Anatomy appeared on the back-end of Leacock’s career as
satirist and public intellectual.  Brinton claims that American intellectuals show no signs of
inspiring a revolution despite their critical views.  “Most of our widely read writers have been
hostile to things as they are in the United States,” says Brinton, “and yet things as they are have
remained quite unthreatened by revolutionary overturn” (46).  Brinton’s explanation for this
societal stability directly channels the belief that the implied alternatives of satirists are not much
different than the systems they are criticising:
Perhaps, indeed, it is the lack of any such immediate better world in the minds of
American intellectuals that explains why they are not playing now the kind of role that the
Voltaires and the Lockes played in the eighteenth century.  (47)  
For the intellectuals of Brinton’s time, the political ideal is not embedded in Marxism or other
revolutionary ideologies but rather in eighteenth-century liberalism (47).  By the dawn of the
twentieth century, these ideals—ideals that informed Leacock’s conception of political
economy—were no longer revolutionary. 
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Brinton’s belief that societal criticisms coming from his American intellectual
contemporaries were not about to spur revolution has been proven right.  However, criticisms
from intellectuals are still capable of sowing discontent.  If society is sufficiently primed for
change, this discontent moves toward what Brinton calls the fever of revolution.  The uprising is
either spontaneous, instigated by self-guided people “moved if you like by a natural force, by a
hatred of injustice” (80), or instigated by “the work of a scheming and unprincipled minority,
freemasons, philosophes, professional agitators” (81).  The democratic idealist would suggest
that it is the self-guided people en masse who are the moving force in any uprising against the
tyranny of power.  However—and this is important—Brinton repeatedly states that “the masses
do not make revolutions” (154).  Once a revolution is underway, Brinton finds that it is
coordinated by a guiding force: 
This is as true of the Bolsheviks as of the Puritans and the Jacobins.  Bums, hoboes, the
mob, the rabble, the riffraff, may be recruited to do the street fighting and the manor
burning of revolutions, but they emphatically do not make, do not run, revolutions—not
even proletarian revolutions.  (105)
If we are to accept Brinton’s premise, we are brought to an undeniable conclusion.  Once the
revolts of spontaneous uprising in a discontented society move into outright revolution, the
masses are being coordinated by organised groups—revolutionaries—who have a purpose in
mind and are manipulating the masses to achieve their purpose.  In other words, the leaders of
revolutions are acting upon and working to enact an ideology.  As Brinton says, revolutionaries
are underpinned by philosophies that lead them to champion a “program to change things,
institutions, laws, not just to convert people” (186).  For Marxists in particular, the actions of the
leadership are key: “Marxism attaches no shame to revolution, and admits the importance of
planning and leadership in revolutionary movements” (82).  Thus, for Brinton when an uprising
or revolt moves into full-fledged revolution, there is sure to be leadership steering the revolution
for an ideological purpose.  
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On its face, Brinton’s belief that ideological leadership steers revolutions seems to nullify
the possibility of satire being able to direct a revolution.  Satirists are generally not political
leaders, and even if they are, satire theorists agree that their underlying ideology is generally
conservative.  It is hard to see how disgruntled conservatives can provide revolutionary
leadership and equally hard to see how their conservative critiques can provide revolutionary
manifestos that will meet Brinton’s requirement of changing “things, institutions, laws.”  This
suggestion will only become more clear in subsequent generations of revolution theory.  What
will also be seen is the consistency of Brinton’s belief that leadership and especially ideology are
key to the implementation of any revolution.
Violence as a Change-Maker: Chalmers Johnson and the Second Generation.  
Second-generation revolutionary theory appears in the 1950s and 1960s.  It largely relies
upon concepts of political violence to create general theories about revolution.  Theories of this
generation—such as Chalmers Johnson’s Revolutionary Change (1966), Samuel P. Huntington’s
Political Order in Changing Societies (1968), and Ted Robert Gurr’s Why Men Rebel (1970)—
tend to use social psychological and structural functionalist models to explain revolts, uprisings,
and revolutions.  As Foran puts it, they “address the ‘why’ question, but were subject to the
criticism that their causal variables (relative deprivation, subsystems disequilibria, and the like)
were vague, difficult to observe, or hard to measure, or were inferred tautologically from a
retrospective vantage point” (3).  Johnson focusses strictly on revolutions, while Huntington and
Gurr look at (and at times conflate) revolutions, rebellions, and riots.  Johnson’s tighter focus on
revolution better-aligns his work with this research, making it more useful for elaboration. 
Revolutionary Change considers how internal and external intrusions into a society
change societal values.  These intrusions can range broadly, from technological advances to
climatological conditions to philosophical shifts.  The intrusions and the resulting changes create
conflicts between the established powers and the rest of society, leading to a state of
disequilibrium and quite often, revolution.  
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Like most theorists of the second generation, Johnson leans heavily on the concept of
violence to explain the revolutionary process.  In fact, for Johnson violence is key.  Non-violent
revolution is a “contradiction in terms” (7) because “changes that occur in society without the use
or threat of violence are nonrevolutionary” (12).  Johnson hinges this distinction between
revolutionary and non-revolutionary change on a rather broad-reaching definition of violence. 
Violence is antisocial action
that deliberately or unintentionally distorts the behavior of others.  Violence is either
behavior that is impossible for others to orient themselves to or behavior that is
deliberately intended to prevent orientation and the development of stable expectations
with regard to it.  Violence is not necessarily brutality, or insensitivity, or the antithesis of
empathy. (8-9) 
In fact, for Johnson the concept of violence is so broad-reaching it “may range in form and
intensity all the way from gratuitous insults to lunatic acts or criminal behaviour” (11).  When
acts of violence disequilibrate the order of the state and the relationships between its actors, these
acts are revolutionary.
Johnson’s definition of violence as revolutionary casts a wide net, capturing satire.  If
distorting the behavior of others through gratuitous insults is violence, then satire is violent. 
Evidencing this, both Feinberg (ITS 260) and Elliott (277) agree that satire has the ability to
change the behaviour of its individual targets.  As well, Feinberg believes that the richest source
of satire is dissimulation, “man’s pretense that he is always motivated by the ideal, the moral, the
good, never by the actual, the immoral, the evil” (ITS 23).  This belief comes head-to-head with
the importance that Johnson places on disequilibration of societal values as an instigator of
revolution.  As an act of dissimulation, satire undermines society’s established institutions,
whose role it is to “justify, defend, and glorify the functions of that society.  Schools, churches,
and governments insist that the society of which they are parts is superior to other societies, that
its faults are at the worst venial, and that its way of life is an excellent one” (ITS 13).  If satire has
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any influence beyond individual targets, then the dissimulation inherent in it will distort not only
the behaviour of individual targets, but also the attitudes of its readers by disequilibrating their
values with the values of their societal institutions. 
However, Johnson’s theory of violence includes a caveat that may very-well discount the
possibility of satire being successfully disequilibrating.  “If acts of revolutionary violence are
quixotic or inappropriate,” Johnson says, “they will not be tolerated by other members of the
system, and instead of terminating the system they will be dealt with as forms of crime or lunacy”
(12).  There are two points to consider here.  First, literary theorist J.A.G. Ardila points out that
“quixotic fictions are generally satiric” (18).  While this is not to claim the inverse—that satire is
generally quixotic—when satire uses humour and ridicule it most certainly is at risk of being
considered quixotic or inappropriate.  Second, Elliott points out that satirists have a long history
of not being tolerated by a society’s establishment.  Often, their criticism of the establishment is
even considered a crime (267).  Perversely, though, as the establishment tightens its grip, satire
tends to improve insofar as it becomes more inventive.  Quoting literary theorist Kenneth Burke,
Elliott suggests that
we might even say that the conditions are “more favourable” to satire under censorship
than under liberalism—for the most inventive satire arises when the artist is seeking to
simultaneously take risks and escape punishment for his boldness, and is never quite
certain himself whether he will be acclaimed or punished.  In proportion as you remove
these conditions of danger, by liberalization, satire becomes arbitrary and effete,
attracting writers of far less spirit and scantier resources.  (265)
While there is great merit to Burke’s claim, there is a problem when satirical critique is
inventively encoded to avoid being considered a crime.  Encoding increases the interpretive
subjectivity of the satire while simultaneously decreasing the possibility of it having a literal
impact.  As such, there is no guarantee that encoded satire will widely disseminate whatever
critique it sets out to make.  Encoding limits satire’s disequilibrating potential.
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Nevertheless, Johnson believes that “true revolution is neither lunacy nor crime.  It is the
acceptance of violence to cause the system to change when all else has failed” (13).  But even if
we are to accept that satire is not lunacy nor crime—and if we are advocates of freedom of
expression we should no doubt accept the latter even if we reject the former—under Johnson’s
theory, if satire’s words constitute acceptable violence then they are appearing after a critical
mass in society has already accepted that the system must change.  This means satire is just as
Feinberg contends: an expression of popular dissatisfaction that is symptomatic, not causal. 
For Johnson, the glue that bonds dynamic elements in a disequilibrated society and “leads
to the development of lines of cleavage” (84) between the old order and a proposed new one is
ideology.  As the old value system falters, ideological competitors emerge (85), then guide a
revolutionary process that—if successful—allows for the implementation of their ideological
values (88).  Johnson sees revolutions much as Brinton does: masses being coordinated by
organised groups—revolutionaries—who have a purpose in mind and are manipulating the
masses to achieve their purpose.  Under Johnson’s theory, exactly where and when ideological
actors begin to exert influence is left unclear.  Johnson claims ideologues spend their time on the
margins of society at times of relative calm, wielding little influence (88).  However, he also
claims that the disequilibration that precedes a revolution is triggered in part by “intellectual
developments” (67).  Johnson provides no specific examples of what constitutes an intellectual
development, but no doubt the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (as but one relevant
example) are intellectual developments that can help spark the disequilibration that leads to
revolution.
Regardless of where ideology rears its head in the whole process of a revolution, just like
Brinton’s theory of revolution, Johnson’s theory pegs ideology as the player that sees revolution
through to the implementation of a new societal value system.  As Johnson notes, the seizure of
power is more than just a technical problem in a revolution (151): for a revolution to successfully
take power, a “general ideological appeal that will bring the revolutionary party the support of the
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people” (147) is needed.  Regardless of how the system is overturned—be it through elections,
military coups, or guerilla warfare—the requirement for ideological appeal remains paramount. 
Of course, ideology is not the only factor in a revolution.  But without ideology, there will be no
alternative system, and with no alternative system, there will be no revolution.  As will be seen in
the third generation of revolution theory, the disequilibrated society and the importance of
ideology remain key to the revolutionary process.
Outside Influences: Theda Skocpol and the Third Generation
Third-generation revolutionary theory emerges in the 1970s and 1980s.  It largely relies
on structuralist models of analysis that explain revolutions by understanding the larger societal
systems that frame society.  Theories of this generation—such as Jeffery Paige’s Agrarian
Revolution (1975), Charles Tilly’s From Mobilization to Revolution (1978), and Theda Skocpol’s
States and Social Revolutions (1979)—advanced upon the knowledge built in the previous
generations.  As Foran writes, theorists in this generation deepened their analysis of “the
macrosociological level of comparing national cases in which the key variables included class
relations, the state, the international economy, and the spread of capitalism into the countryside”
(2).  Skocpol’s work, as the most-cited of this generation, deserves elaboration.  
States and Social Revolutions uses comparative history to explain the French, Russian,
and Chinese Revolutions.  Unlike many theorists, Skocpol tries to marginalise the role of
ideological actors as the creators of revolutions.  For her, “revolutions are not made; they come”
(17).  She founds this belief on the premise similar to Johnson’s, that a “crisis of the state” (17) is
what spawns revolutions.  It is only when a state is in crisis that the door is opened for
revolutionaries to actualise their vision of change.
Unfortunately for the examination of literature and satire, Skocpol’s theory is tightly
delimited.  It stays focussed on the role of state structures and international conflicts.  The closest
States and Social Revolutions comes to considering literature is through Skocpol’s broader
observations about how intellectuals and the literati lose legitimacy in pre-revolutionary and
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revolutionary times.  The loss is largely because this group is dependent upon and intertwined
with the state (61, 72, 87).  In other words, intellectuals and the literati are not vanguards of
revolution; they are part of the failing apparatus that is to be revolted against.  Skocpol’s
placement of the literati in the realm of the (failing) ruling apparatus means that satirists are
amongst those losing legitimacy.  The loss of legitimacy of intellectuals stands in contrast to
Brinton’s belief that intellectuals transfer allegiance prior to revolution.  If the literati become
illegitimate sources of state-sponsored knowledge in a pre-revolutionary and revolutionary
society, then it is hard to claim that satire has any role in spawning revolutions.  
According to Skocpol, a crisis of the state is brought about when state organisations that
are susceptible to administrative and military collapse are subject to intensified outside pressures
(154).  These outside pressures—such as industrial progress and repeated losses at war—intrude
into the values and technological systems of the state.  Skocpol agrees with Johnson that these
intrusions result in a dis-synchronisation of values between the state and its lower classes.  “Once
dis-synchronization sets in,” Skocpol believes, “people in the society become disoriented, and
hence open to conversion to the alternative values proposed by the revolutionary movement”
(12).  Here, much as with Johnson’s theory, Skocpol offers a sliver of light for contending that
satire is a revolutionary force.  Because satire is a critique, it may have potential as a dis-
synchronising agent. 
In suggesting this possibility, it must be repeated that Skocpol believes it is outside
pressures such as industrial progress and failed wars, rather than the literati or even revolutionary
vanguards, that dis-synchronise society.  “Revolutionary organizations and ideologies have
helped to cement the solidarity of radical vanguards before and/or during revolutionary crises,”
says Skocpol, “but in no sense did such vanguards—let alone vanguards with large, mobilized,
and ideologically imbued mass followings—ever create the revolutionary crises they have
exploited” (17).  Only when the crisis is in place can revolution be launched: ideological actors in
the state’s agrarian sociopolitical structures use the crisis to lead widespread peasant revolts
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(154).  But for a society even to get to the point of widespread revolt, the crisis must be dramatic
and the state must be highly disorganised and ineffective; as Skocpol contends, “even after great
loss of legitimacy has occurred, a state can remain quite stable —and certainly invulnerable to
internal mass-based revolts—especially if its coercive organizations remain coherent and
effective” (32).  
Thus, for Skocpol revolution happens not because revolutionaries (or satirists) set the
table for the state to be toppled.  Rather, revolution happens because states experience massive,
externally-created values shifts—usually through economic changes and war—that they cannot
counteract due to their own structural vulnerabilities.  It is only once the crisis is in place that the
conditions are created for revolutionaries to move in to try and supplant the existent dominant
ideology with their revolutionary ideology.  Even though Skocpol dismisses the possibility of
ideology taking the driver’s seat throughout the whole process of a revolution, just like Brinton
and Johnson, her theory acknowledges the importance of ideology.  In fact, she later honed her
definition and theory of revolution in “Cultural Idioms and Political Ideologies in the
Revolutionary Reconstruction of State Power: A Rejoinder to Sewell” (1985) to give more
credence to the role of ideology.  Unlike Brinton and to a lesser-extent Johnson, Skocpol’s theory
of revolution puts the revolutionary ideology in play only after the state has self-destructed. 
Nevertheless, when revolution is successful the end result is the same for all three theories: the
implementation of a new overarching ideology.  As Skocpol says, “revolutions have transformed
state organizations, class structures, and dominant ideologies” (3).  The fundamental difference
between States and Social Revolutions and earlier theories is that ideology comes into play much
later in the revolutionary process.
Ideology: The Glue that Bonds the Generations
Across the first three generations of revolution theory, ideology is both ever-present and
vital.  This is not to say that a revolution is necessarily reducible to ideology, but without a
replacement ideology to offer the citizenry, there can be no revolution.  As revolutionary theory
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moves into a fourth generation, Jack Goldstone maintains that ideology must maintain its
prominent role (175).  And it is not just Goldstone, Skocpol, Johnson, and Brinton whose
theories point to the central role of ideology in a revolution.  Virtually every other theorist of
revolution understands ideology’s importance.  Kramnick perhaps says it best when he
summarises that in both the great historical and modern revolutions, “one finds a sustained and
self-conscious effort to reconstruct society along theoretical principles provided by some vision
of an ideal order, an ideology.  This is what revolution has meant since the late eighteenth
century” (31).  Thus, when Goldstone says that revolutions are marked by “efforts to change the
political regime that draw on a competing vision (or visions) of a just order,” ideology is exactly
what he is talking about.  Ideology may not offer a monocausal explanation for revolution, but
the implementation of a revolution hinges upon ideology. 
Is Satire Sufficiently Ideological to be Revolutionary?
If a revolution’s efforts to transform the political institutions and justifications for
political authority in society hinge upon changing dominant ideology, is satire sufficiently
ideological to be revolutionary?  To make this final determination, a closer look at the concept of
ideology is required.  Because Goldstone lays out three requirements for a successful
revolutionary ideology, he provides a good place to start a consideration of satire and ideology. 
For Goldstone, a successful revolutionary ideology must:
(a) inspire a broad range of followers by resonating with existing cultural guideposts, 
(b) provide a sense of inevitability and destiny about its followers’ success, and 
(c) persuade people that the existing authorities are unjust and weak.  (156)
Satire can easily fulfill two of these requirements.  As established in chapter two, persuading
people that existing authorities are unjust and weak is the purpose of satire—especially satire of
the political variety: satire is a form of critique.  And resonating with existing cultural guideposts
is an ingrained feature of satire: satire has a habit of invading already-familiar forms of literature. 
However, satire runs into serious trouble with Goldstone’s second requirement: providing a sense
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of inevitability and destiny about its followers’ success.  With perhaps the exception of a few
utopian satires, where does satire offer any suggestion of a successful destiny?  No theorist of
satire is suggesting that satire provides a destiny.  Rather, they are all telling us that satire is
characterised by irresolution, a world in which things at best return to the point where they
began.  Unless we revert back to the fourteenth-century’s celestial definition of revolution, it
cannot be contended that satire is sufficiently ideological to be revolutionary.  It is missing a
revolutionary destiny, one of Goldstone’s three requirements for a successful revolutionary
ideology.  As such, satire does not offer up the full ideological prescription to be revolutionary. 
Satire’s inability to provide a bona fide revolutionary prescription becomes more apparent
when moving from Goldstone’s requirements for a successful revolutionary ideology into
actually defining ideology.  The term ideology emerged from the carnage of the French
Revolution.  In Enlightenment fashion, French philosopher Antoine Destutt de Tracy introduced
the concept in 1797 as a method of providing a non-religious, rational foundation for analysing
and developing ideas about how society could be politically organised (Freeden 14).  Destutt de
Tracy’s conception of ideology remains broadly accepted today.  However, the term has been
much expanded since its introduction.  Terry Eagleton observes in Ideology: An Introduction that
“the term ‘ideology’ has a whole range of useful meanings, not all of which are compatible with
each other” (1).  Ideology’s library of sometimes-incompatible definitions has left the term so
muddled that Marxist scholar David McLellan believes it may very well be “the most elusive
concept in the whole of the social science” (1).  Thus, even more so than defining satire or
defining revolution, defining ideology is a difficult task.  Eagleton’s Ideology alone offers sixteen
introductory definitions, and “to try to compress this wealth of meaning into a single
comprehensive definition would thus be unhelpful even if it were possible” (1).  Further
complicating defining ideology is political philosopher Graeme Duncan’s point in
“Understanding Ideology” that even definitions of ideologies are ideological.  Each definition
serves “political purposes, justifying one kind of regime rather than another, expressing particular
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attitudes towards reason and passion, liberation and imperfection, towards classes, mass
movements and so on” (649).  Because any definition of ideology is inherently ideological,
Duncan warns that “the theoretical and especially political standpoints of students of ideologies
are hence vital in determining what they are about” (650).  No research is above this.  In this
case, the definition of ideology that is chosen must serve—at least to some useful degree—the
research purpose: understanding the revolutionary potential of satire in the context of Leacock’s
two greatest works of fiction.
To settle on a definition of ideology, looking at Leacock’s writings on the concept is a
must.  As with the concepts of satire and revolution, gleaning Leacock’s approach to ideology
requires close analysis of his words.  It is almost in passing that he defines ideology in Elements
of Political Science.  Elements views the discipline of political science as “the theory of the state”
(12).  Subservient to the theory of the state are ideologies, or what Leacock calls the “solutions
that have been offered in theory and practice to the open question of government control” (358). 
This definition reveals something about the general shape of political studies in his time.  For
example, George Holland Sabine’s widely-used 1937 textbook A History of Political Theory is
structured similarly to Leacock’s text, beginning with ancient theories of the state and then
moving into modern ideologies.  This definition also reveals something about Leacock.  He is no
revolutionary and his definition—one that positions the theory of ideology as subservient to both
the theory of the state and the practice of government—suggests that Leacock views the state
presupposing the concept of ideology.  Thus, his definition of ideology is limited because its
subservience to the state excludes the revolutionary idea of overthrowing the very concept of “the
state as we knew it,” the warning about revolution Leacock makes in Unsolved Riddle.  A more
encompassing definition of ideology that can accommodate the tenets of revolution is needed. 
In searching for a definition of ideology that can accommodate the tenets of a revolution,
it becomes apparent that there is a common thread running through almost every conception of
ideology.  As Duncan points out, every thoughtful definition of ideology “include[s] judgements
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and prescriptions for action or inaction” (650).  For these research purposes, one particular work
stands out.  In The Age of Ideology, political theorist John Schwarzmantel puts forth what may
very well be one of the word’s clearest definitions.  Schwarzmantel says that
Political ideologies provide central organizing frameworks for political debate and action. 
Each ideology contains three elements: critique, ideal and agency.  Political ideologies
offer a criticism of existing society, which is condemned as imperfect and contrasted with
some vision of ‘the good society’ that is to be attained.  Each ideology offers a view of
agency or the means by which the movement from an imperfect to a better society is to be
achieved.  Furthermore a political ideology operates with a certain view of human nature,
sketching out the potentialities and limitations of the human subject.  (2) 
Schwarzmantel’s definition of ideology serves this research in two important ways.  First, its
belief that ideology contains a vision of the good society intersects with Goldstone’s belief that
revolutions draw on competing visions of what constitutes a just order, thus verifying the role of
ideology in revolution.  Second, its three-point taxonomy of critique, ideal, and agency intersects
with the understanding of satire as a form of critique.  Admittedly, this particular definition
serves the research purposes, but it is not a tautological choice.  Critique, ideal, and agency are
the central components ideology in countless works, including Andrew Heywood’s Political
Ideologies: An Introduction.  Heywood confirms that this three-element definition is commonly
used and “entirely in line with the social-scientific use of the term” (12). 
Schwarzmantel’s three-element approach to ideology is where the notion of satire as
revolutionary falls apart.  There is no doubt that satire is a critique, and it is fair to say that satire
contains a low view of human nature, but satire need not and almost always does not offer an
ideal or agency.  Therefore, satire is missing two key elements of ideology.  Revolution, on the
other hand, is dependent upon ideology so that it can transform society.  Satire, as an ideals- and
agency-less critique, is incapable of directing the revolutionary transformation.  As such, satire
cannot be revolutionary. 
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In making this claim, how is the door closed on Elliott’s belief that by tearing foundations
down, satire is revolutionary?  As a form of demolition—leading edge or not—satire’s critique
can help a revolution by preparing the way for positive action.  There is evidence of this across
all three generations of revolution theory.  But as Brinton points out, the people who do the street
fighting and manor burning in a revolution—“bums, hoboes, the mob, the rabble, and the
riffraff”—“emphatically do not make, do not run, revolutions” (105).  They are, as Goldstone
reminds us, the accompaniment to a revolution.  They exist to serve revolutionary leaders.  Satire
works in the same way.  It may and very likely does have a destabilising effect.  But without
prescribing ideal and agency, satire’s critique does not say how an effort should unfold “to
transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in society,” as
Goldstone’s definition of revolution requires.  Satire can be a tool for revolutionaries, but satire
on its own does not provide the ideological roadmap to a new society.
Looking Towards Leacock
Feinberg asserts that “satire has not caused any major reorganization of society” (ITS
259).  By building a theoretical understanding of satire’s convergence with and deviation from
revolution, we can see that satire has an overwhelming urge to critique, but critique is only one of
ideology’s three components.  The ideal and agency that are needed to implement a new,
revolutionary ideology appear to be missing from satire.   
This theory established, it can now be tested against Stephen Leacock’s two greatest
satires, Arcadian Adventures with the Idle Rich and Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town.  The
following two chapters will consider the democratic electoral processes put forth in Arcadian
Adventures and Sunshine Sketches.  Is Leacock merely critiquing?  Or do these books also
prescribe an ideal and agency to remedy these problems?  Answering these questions will help us
understand if Leacock is spurring revolutionary change, or—perhaps more likely—expose
Leacock’s conservative belief that the problems in our democratic electoral system simply reflect
intractable human conditions. 
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Chapter Four: Arcadian Adventures and Absent Alternatives
Leacock the political economist believes in the principle of democracy.  Elements of
Political Science affirms that “the principle of democratic rule has now become a permanent and
essential factor in political institutions” (51).  In “The Revision of Democracy,” Leacock
reaffirms his belief in democracy’s permanence, stating that “no one supposes that feudal
property and feudal rights, clerical control and the heredity order of society are coming back
again” (7-8).  The Unsolved Riddle of Social Justice reaffirms Leacock’s belief in democracy’s
essential nature, stating that “democracy... is the best system of government as yet operative in
this world of sin” (111).  Leacock believed democracy to be an essential component of western
government throughout his life, and an irreversible component up until World War II. 
Regardless of Leacock’s lifelong support of the principle of democracy, Arcadian
Adventures with the Idle Rich and Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town reveal the unsavoury ways
that democracy functions and produces governments.  This is not surprising, since Leacock the
satirist has a mandate to critique.  This chapter and the next will explore Leacock’s portrayals of
democracy in Arcadian Adventures and Sunshine Sketches.  Each chapter will reveal two major
themes:
1.  there is an underlying anti-revolutionary thread to Leacock’s critique; and 
2.  critique of the existent order is ever-present, but alternative ideals and agency to
reorganise society are missing from, marginalised by, or ridiculed by these books. 
Together, such an analysis will demonstrate that no matter how devastating Leacock’s critiques
of western liberal democracy may be, his two greatest satires are consistent with the intersection
of the theory of satire with the theory of revolution.  Both books reject revolution, and neither
book offers a serious ideological ideal and agency for society to implement in place of the
existent order.  
The examination begins with Arcadian Adventures.  Adventures primarily critiques an
insular plutocratic class who commandeer the democratic process to further their own goals. 
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Such a portrayal broadly circles around Leacock’s fear that the insidious poison of commercial
greed defiles the wells of public honesty, while concurrently demonstrating how democracy can
devolve into the rule of ‘cliques’ and ‘interests’ and ‘bosses.’ 
The Futility of Revolution: An Inauspicious Beginning to Arcadian Adventures
Democracy, governance, and elections are the focus of “The Great Fight for Clean
Government,” the climactic chapter of Arcadian Adventures.  However, this chapter cannot be
fully understood without first looking at how Leacock sets the table for the Great Fight.  Gerald
Lynch rightly summarises Adventures’ overarching theme and voice by pointing out that “it is the
blatancy of the pecuniary motives behind all Plutorian ‘idle’ action that makes the ironic voice in
the Adventures relatively easy to understand” (Humour and Humanity 125).  While Plutorians are
obsessed with building wealth, more can be said about their overarching worldview.  
Adventures begins in the Mausoleum Club, a social club on Plutoria’s quietest and
wealthiest street.  Almost immediately the “great national questions” (3) that concern the
Plutorians who frequent the club are laid out.  For them, these questions are “the protective tariff
and the need of raising it, the sad decline of the morality of the working man, the spread of
syndicalism and the lack of Christianity in the labour class, and the awful growth of selfishness
among the mass of the people” (3).  For a work of irony, these concerns are peculiar: every one
of them to some degree reflects Leacock’s conservatism.  He supports targeted use of protective
tariffs (Economic Prosperity 163), is a private non-believer in god (Staines 235) who publicly
asserts that religion, as the source of society’s moral code, is in decline (“Devil and the Deep
Blue Sea” 45), holds that selfishness is an innate human trait that must be constrained (“What is
Left” 43), and is greatly concerned across many of his writings about the spread of socialism.  It
is not unreasonable to imagine Leacock discussing very similar questions in the University Club
of Montreal, his favourite social spot in that city.  Because Leacock is possibly serious in laying
out these “great national questions,” it appears that there is room for plutocrats in Leacock’s
conservative conception of society: they do not need to be overturned so much as they need to be
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put in check.  As Adventures unfolds, it becomes clear that moral decline and selfishness are not
restricted to the great masses.  Plutoria’s upper crust are also selfish and in moral decline. 
However, they are too blind to see it.
The first of the blind Plutorians we meet is Lucullus Fyshe.  Fyshe does not see himself as
selfish but rather believes himself to be so “democratic” (4, 6, 15-16) he is “more or less a
revolutionary socialist” (6).  This “revolutionary socialist” views the British class system as
tyranny, worthy of being revolted against.  Much like how the great national questions of the
plutocrats find commonality with Leacock’s views, Fyshe’s concern with the tyranny of Britain’s
class system also finds commonality.  Leacock reveals in The Boy I Left Behind Me that as a
child he came to believe that the American Revolution was justified, insofar as the British class
system delivered “the burning injustice of tyranny” (58) to the American colonies.  “The theory
of a republic, and the theory of equality, and the condemnation of hereditary rights,” Leacock
continues in Boy, “seemed obvious and self-evident truths” (58).  Despite the general agreement
between Fyshe’s words and Leacock’s beliefs about British class-based tyranny, Fyshe’s
concerns with British tyranny are not being used to suggest that revolution is altogether useful. 
Rather, Fyshe—as the embodiment of America’s wealthy upper class—is being presented as an
illustration of the futility of revolution.  
Adventures illustrates this futility by painting Fyshe as no less tyrannical than the
hereditary British upper class that the American Revolution replaced.  As Fyshe wonders “how
the working-class, the proletariat, stand for such tyranny [of the British hereditary class] is more
than I can see” (7), a waiter serves him half-cold asparagus.  Outraged, Fyshe berates the waiter,
sends the asparagus back, and proclaims that he would fire the whole staff and put them on the
street if he was in a position to do so.  The mismatch of Fyshe’s words and actions make the
irony—like almost all irony in Adventures—obvious.  It is not difficult to imagine a petulant
British lord acting just like Fyshe.  What must not be missed, though, is how in a republic
founded on the theory of equality the ruling class still mistreat the lower classes.  The American
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Revolution did nothing to halt class-based tyranny: it simply replaced a hereditary aristocracy
with an economic aristocracy.  While Adventures acknowledges that it is conceivable to join the
economic aristocracy—Mr. and Mrs. Newberry rose to their positions of wealth in Plutoria—
Plutoria’s economic aristocracy is almost entirely a heredity class: Adventures’ describes the
children of Plutoria Avenue as all being born into unearned positions of unthinkable wealth and
power.  That tyranny and unearned power exist in both a hereditary monarchy and a capitalist
republic embodies Leacock’s point that “it is silly to break away from established institution on
the ground of a purely theoretical fault” (Boy 58).  Leacock points out that it is not aristocracy but
rather power hierarchies that create tyranny and promote heredity.  What is the point of
overthrowing any system in the name of equality, when the end result is simply a different
privileged class that still disrespects the lower classes? 
Just as Adventures establishes early on that revolution may be pointless, so too does
Adventures live up to satire’s tendency to not offer much in the way of alternatives.  This lack of
alternatives is largely accomplished through Leacock’s habit of keeping his critical narrative eye
on the rich.  He turns away from them only long enough to offer a peek at counterbalancing
views.  The scant attention paid to the Waiters’ International Union and their organisation of a
strike, the only direct mention of organised labour and socialism in Adventures aside from a
single line in “The Love Story of Peter Spillikins,” demonstrates the book’s lack of alternatives. 
The reader knows that labour action is looming over the club, but is left almost entirely in the
dark regarding the details.  Nowhere does Adventures spell out the demands of the workers, nor
does it explore the relationship between organised labour and revolutionary socialist forces. 
Rather, a few anticlimactic lines about a looming “social catastrophe” (7, 20, 21) are bandied
about, in Leacock’s masterful style of creating humour by overselling then under-delivering. 
When the strike happens, the social catastrophe is nothing more than a dinner party for the rich
coming to an unceremonious end.  The oversell/under-delivery marginalises labour action as a
potent form of social disruption.  Making matters worse from a revolutionary perspective, even
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though Leacock agrees with many of the demands of socialists and organised labour—Leacock’s
red toryism is well known but less-well known is his very supportive articulation of socialist
demands in a 1910 Montreal Standard feature that reviews and often endorses positions of
socialist parties across the western world—Adventures paints unionisation as suspect and
corrupting.  When Mausoleum Club staff sign union cards, they experience a “wonderful
transformation from respectable Chinese to slouching loafers of the lowest type” (19).  While this
is likely the plutocratic view of unions, even if read as ironic overstatement it is hardly a glowing
endorsement of unionisation.  Regardless, while the rich being left without a meal is satisfying,
Adventures virtually ignores the substance and effectiveness of the socialist alternative.  
As Arcadian Adventures moves closer to its climactic election, its focus remains on
exposing the flaws of the rich.  Counterbalancing portrayals are not intended to spell out the ideal
and agency of alternative ideologies, but rather they are used to highlight the undesirability of the
plutocrats.  Nevertheless, one of these counterbalancing portrayals comes close to offering a full-
on alternative to Plutorian society: “The Wizard of Finance” and “The Arrested Philanthropy of
Mr. Tomlinson” idealise a life of working the land, living as a nuclear family.  Tomlinson, a
farmer who accidentally becomes rich when a vacationing geology professor discovers gold on
his farm, moves to Plutoria.  However, he holds “infinite regret” (29) that his farm has been
overtaken by mining speculators.  This inability to become accustomed to the plutocratic life
allows Tomlinson to avoid Adventures’ prophecy that “once grown used to [the life of the rich],
it is... impossible to go back” (3).  Determined to return to an agrarian life, Tomlinson sets his
mind to ridding himself of his fortune.  But the plutocratic cog is powerful, making Tomlinson’s
task difficult.  
Tomlinson’s strategy to rid himself of his fortune is simple: make bad investments. 
Unfortunately, the plutocrats have assigned Tomlinson the moniker “The Wizard of Finance,” so
every purchase he makes is viewed as an indicator of good judgment.  Every rickety stock, lousy
security, or fraudulent bond he buys leads to a speculative surge in its value, rendering it
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impossible for him to go broke.  While it is never entirely clear why Tomlinson does not simply
pick up and leave Plutoria, he is able to free himself from Plutoria only when it is discovered that
the gold samples from his land were salted, leaving the mine worthless and thus ruining his
“Wizard” reputation with the plutocrats.  Upon returning to his farm, Tomlinson destroys the
mining infrastructure and ruptures the dam.  As a result, “Nature reached out its hand and drew
its coverlet of green over the grave of the vanished Eldorado” (65), taking back Tomlinson’s
land.  The closing scene paints nature as supreme over the plutocracy, their only defeat in
Adventures.  Tomlinson’s rejection of plutocracy in favour of living off of the land is the
strongest articulation of a counterbalancing ideal and agency in all of the book.  
However, Tomlinson’s return to rural life is not a revolutionary proposal for a better
society.  Rather, it is a conservative look backwards.  Tomlinson embodies a passing way of life,
pushing against the tide of industrialisation and urbanisation.  In fact, Leacock is quite definitive
in works such as “The Woman Question” (54) and The Unsolved Riddle (20-23) that rural life
has largely been swept aside in favour of cities and the machine age.  Further suggesting there is
nothing revolutionary about Tomlinson’s return to the farm, he has no agency once in Plutoria. 
His exit is not his to make, but rather dictated by the plutocrats: Tomlinson is only able to leave
Plutoria when the plutocrats reject him and his fortune is rendered worthless, not when he rejects
the plutocrats.  Finally, in the way that satire theory says that alternatives are marginalised,
Tomlinson is shuffled off not even halfway into Adventures, never to be spoken of again. 
Any discussion of Tomlinson cannot be complete without a brief consideration of how in
a handful of ways, he is the character in Adventures most like Leacock.  Both men, after all, share
a love for the land.  Leacock returned to his beloved Old Brewery Bay estate at the earliest
opportunity every spring, where he wrote, fished, and grew produce.  Leacock even took great
pride in trying to live off the land.  He ate and served food that was grown on his estate and sold
the excess in Orillia’s markets.  Given their shared ideals, it is little wonder that Tomlinson’s
return to his farm contains Adventures’ only victory over the plutocrats.  Somewhat darkly,
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though, the Tomlinson/Leacock connection also plays into the conservative worldview of the
irony of results.  Much like how the plutocratic ruling class holds all the cards as the ones able to
reject Tomlinson, Leacock was rejected by the ruling class of McGill University when they
forced him into retirement in 1936.  Even more ironic, unlike nature’s reclamation of
Tomlinson’s land, Leacock’s Old Brewery Bay estate was largely bulldozed to make way for a
condominium development in the years following his passing.  
Nature may triumph over the plutocrats with Tomlinson’s misadventure, but its triumph
is short-lived.  When Adventures next returns to nature—a visit to the Newberrys’ Castel
Casteggio in “The Love Story of Peter Spillikins”—the land is all private property, “as all nature
ought to be” (101).  Castel Casteggio’s countryside is landscaped, the bush is cleared out, and the
lake is raised ten feet with stone-banked sides.  And just as on Tomlinson’s land, there is gold-
digging going on: Mrs. Everleigh successfully seduces the wealthy but myopic Peter Spillikins
into marriage, for no other reason than to backfill her and her lover Captain Cormorant’s ailing
finances.  Tossed aside is The Little Girl in Green, the poor cousin of the Newberrys who saw
“such wonderful things about [Peter Spillikins] as nobody had ever seen before” (108).  Of
course, mergers based solely on financial principles are par for the course in Plutoria.  The
Spillikins-Everleigh merger is merely a prelude to the merger of St. Osoph’s and St. Asaph’s
Churches, also done for financial reasons.  In this case, the Plutorians toss aside Reverend
McTeague, who holds a genuine and life-long interest in theology.  As Gerald Lynch observes in
the Afterword to the 1989 New Canadian Library edition of Adventures, 
Those in Arcadian Adventures who are close to the values at the centre of Leacock’s tory-
humanist norm.... are subsumed by the ascendent plutocracy in a final triumph of
darkness.  These “good people,” as Leacock calls them, offer but an ineffectual
opposition to the empowered plutocrats: they and what they represent are rejected,
defeated, or vulgarized beyond recognition.  (211)
In its critique of the ascendency of the rich, every single alternative that Adventures offers is
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marginalised and then rejected, just as satire theory dictates it will be.
The tendency of the rich in Adventures to reject and dispose of people blocking their path
to ascendency suggests that there is something theoretically going on beyond the book’s oft-
repeated connection to Thorstein Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure Class (see, for example, Bentley
xiii; Bissell 14; Doyle 195; Lynch Humour and Humanity 150; Nerbas).  Indeed, Plutorians
consume for display, but Plutorians are also lousy human beings with unearned privilege, bent on
controlling society.  This suggests that Arcadian Adventures has a secondary theoretical parallel:
John Stuart Mill’s Chapters on Socialism.  Mill’s outline of socialist objections to society
generally follows the same trajectory as Adventures.  Adventures and Chapters both open by
pointing out that there is a disproportionate number of working poor people in society, an
injustice “made only more grating by contrast” (262) to the lives of the rich.  The rich, Mill adds,
attain their privilege primarily through little more than the circumstances of their birth (265). 
Mill’s outline continues like the progression of Adventures when he points out that, like the
plutocratic rise of Tomlinson, “next to birth, the chief cause of success in life is accident and
opportunity” (265).  While Mill does not then specifically trace moral and religious decline as
Adventures does, Mill seemingly summarises the players in Adventures when he says that the rich
prosper “by sevility [sic] and sycophancy, by hardhearted and close-fisted selfishness, by the
permitted lies and tricks of trade, by gambling speculations, not seldom by downright knavery”
(266).  Is there any better way to describe a band of individuals who purchase stocks based on
nothing more than a buyer’s reputation, who chase off a senior minister in their quest to merge
two churches, who marry for financial gain while adulterously carrying on second lives, and who
salt mineral samples to spark a mining boom?  And this just scratches the surface of their
knavery.  Rounding out the parallels between Chapters and Adventures, Mill concludes his
recounting of the socialist critique by pointing out that “society, in short, is traveling onward,
according to these speculators, toward a new feudality, that of the great capitalists” (267).  It is
no small coincidence that Adventures concludes with the rich taking absolute control of the
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church and then the civic government.  The parallels between Chapters and Adventures are made
only more curious by the fact that Leacock must have been very familiar with Mill’s Chapters on
Socialism: his aforementioned 1910 Montreal Standard feature “Socialism and the Future” reads
like an abridged and updated version of it. 
Between the suggestion that revolution is futile, the virtually-ignored alternatives, and
even the hint of legitimacy in some of the plutocratic societal critique, Arcadian Adventures is
not a manifesto for change.  Just as satire theory states, Adventures critiques what exists but does
not propose an alternative.  Thus, when it is finally time for the Great Fight for Clean
Government in Arcadian Adventures, it should come as no surprise that the election is not a
conflict of ideologies.  Rather, the election is a continuation of Adventures’ tight focus on the
hypocrisy of the rich.  It unfolds as an exposé of plutocratic desires to secure a stronger grip on
all things in society, so that they may advance their financial positions.
The Great Fight for Clean Government: The Genesis of the Plutorian Critique
“The Great Fight for Clean Government” opens with Mr. Newberry and Mr. Dick
Overend lamenting government corruption.  The two believe that the city, state, and federal
governments are all deplorable.  However, the focus of their lament is Plutoria’s civic
administration.  Local aldermen’s names, they claim, are “simply a byword throughout the
United States for rank criminal corruption” (169).  That said, the plutocrats make this claim with
no idea of who their aldermen are.  A search through the papers to find their names reveals
something infuriating:
Alderman Schwefeldampf was an undertaker!  Think of it!  In a city with a hundred and
fifty deaths a week, and sometimes even better, an undertaker sat on the council!  A city
that was about to expropriate land and to spend four hundred thousand dollars for a new
cemetery, had an undertaker on the expropriation committee itself!  And worse than that! 
Alderman Undercutt was a butcher!  In a city that consumed a thousand tons of meat
every week!  And Alderman O’Hooligan—it leaked out—was an Irishman!  Imagine it! 
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An Irishman sitting on the police committee of the council in a city where thirty-eight and
a half out of every hundred policemen were Irish, either by birth or parentage!  The thing
was monstrous.  (170-71)
At first blush, there is little that is inherently monstrous with these conflicts.  Yet there is truth in
what is being said.  Adventures reveals the simple fact that every elected representative is going
to be connected to certain constituencies within society.  This means that no matter who is voted
into office, there is a risk of the rule of interests.  However, the Plutorians are not frustrated with
city council due to a higher principle about the rule of interests.  Their frustration is because the
city’s public office holders do not rule for plutocratic interests.  Any public office holder not part
of the plutocratic class, after all, could impede their single-minded desire to advance their
financial gain.
Frustrated as they are, the Plutorian frustration with local government is not the dawn of a
fresh realisation: “The fact was that their conversation reflected not so much their own original
ideas as a general wave of feeling that was passing over the whole community” (169).  This
general wave of feeling is not even restricted to the city: the wave is crashing over the entire
country.  Every region has put its own spin on it—from a revival of William Penn’s Quaker
values in Philadelphia to a western revolt against the spirit of the east—but as a whole “it was not
just clear how and where this movement of indignation started” (170).  Adding to the wave’s
inexplicable nature, not only is its source unknown but its direction has no ideological bearing:
“When this wave of feeling struck the city, nobody knew or cared who were aldermen, anyway”
(169).  The wave’s inexplicable origin and direction is anti-revolutionary in its discounting of the
central Marxist belief that prior organisation creates revolution.  Even if the wave is the result of
Marxist organisation—and Adventures provides no indication of this—the varying regional spins
about the wave’s origin suggest that people will credit dis-synchronisation between the voters
and the ruling class to whatever fits their preferred narrative.  That everyone is clamouring to
take credit for the wave channels Theda Skocpol’s belief about the role that ideology plays in a
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revolution.  Recall her contention that revolutions are not made, they come.  Society enters a
state of dis-synchronisation and only then can revolutionary forces take advantage of the situation
to overthrow the state and implement their own ideology.  Broadly, this is what unfolds in the
Great Fight.  The Plutocrats bumble into the realisation that society is dis-synchronised and then
they successfully exploit the situation for their own ends.  The Mausoleum Club may have helped
cement Plutorian solidarity prior to the wave breaking out, but the Plutorians did not create the
crisis they are about to exploit.  
To be sure, it is difficult to definitively assert that Adventures’ Great Fight is a revolution. 
Nevertheless, the question nicely illustrates the contested nature of revolution theory.  Plutoria’s
election envelops certain revolutionary characteristics.  The violence that occurs in the campaign
fits into prescriptions of how revolutions unfold, especially under Chalmers Johnson’s theory of
revolution.  As well, the plutocrats’ backroom organising to put a new group in charge of
Plutoria makes the election something of a putsch, thus fitting into Crane Brinton’s theory of
revolution.  If the Great Fight is a violent putsch, then the Great Fight is a revolution that comes
from the right.  Kushner and Macdonald make this point when they claim that the violence and
the plutocratic rule it produces marks the creation of a totalitarian and fascist state (504).  
However, there are a few wrinkles in declarations of Plutoria’s election as a revolution. 
Foremostly, the Great Fight does not appear to truly transform Plutoria’s political institutions
into something new, as required under Goldstone’s definition of revolution.  The election merely
changes the hands on the existing levers of power.  The one institutional transformation that
could be considered revolutionary—the state legislature’s promise to move Plutoria along with
all other communities in the state from council government to board government—is completely
legitimate under the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  States have the power
to structure local government as they wish.  Switching local government from council to board
would appear to be the state using its existing powers in a brazenly opportunistic and perhaps
counter-revolutionary way: board governance staples on a veneer of change to satisfy a dis-
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synchronised public’s appetite for change, while acting as a breakwater before the “general wave
of feeling” hits state-level elections.  Besides, Adventures is thin on details about what board
government means in practice: the only character who may know is Fyshe, and he is either tight-
lipped or ignorant when asked.  Ostensibly, though, the only change that will come is an increase
in civic politician pay.  Civic government’s core functions—“the creation and control of such
tangible utilities (roads, bridges, water supply) as are of general benefit in their particular area”
(Elements 297)—must remain intact with Plutoria’s board government, because the plutocrats are
jockeying for better control of the dispensation of contracts related to these core functions.  The
plutocrats already have many of these contracts locked up before the election, and the election is
their chance to use public office to skim more off the city.  
Further complicating any revolutionary declarations about the Great Fight are Leacock’s
hints that the plutocrats already have defacto control of the state government, where true
constitutional authority lies.  Look at the places Fyshe and Boulder have state politicians meet
them when they demand a switch from council to board government:
• The Democratic State Committee chairman meets them at the Buchanan Club, a
statement about ineffective politicians: James Buchanan is widely considered America’s
most inadequate president.  
• The Republican State Committee chairman meets them in a box at the Lincoln Theatre,
a darker statement about the life-and-death power that the plutocrats hold over politicians:
Lincoln was shot and killed in a theatre box.  
The downward creep of plutocratic control from state government to local government makes the
Great Fight an illustration of the intensification of plutocratic power.  Because local governments
are constitutional creatures of the state, the plutocrats would already have considerable but
indirect influence over civic government.  
The case for the Great Fight being a fascist revolution is compelling, but the lack of
details in Adventures leaves doubt.  Are Plutoria’s civic institutions structurally transformed, or
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is plutocratic control of government—something Leacock believes already exists (“Tyranny”
64)—simply intensified?  Either way, Leacock is illustrating just how tight the plutocratic grip on
society is.  Adventures already paints the plutocrats as having control over nature, well-illustrated
by Mr. Newberry’s ability to “command dynamite and control the forces of nature” (113), and
Adventures already paints the plutocrats as having control over religion, well-illustrated by the
merger of St. Asaph’s and St. Osoph’s into a shareholder corporation where “points of doctrine,
belief or religious principle may be freely altered, amended, reversed or entirely abolished at any
general annual meeting” (161).  Revolution or not, the Great Fight is an intensification of
plutocratic control of all things in society.  Leacock’s satirical mandate remains the same: to
critique this control and put the plutocrats in check.
Completing the Plutorian Ideology: The Plutorian Ideal and Agency
The Great Fight may not be a fascist revolution, but it is an election campaign and the
plutocrats do have a fully-developed ideology on offer.  Once the plutocratic critique of civic
government as a group of corrupt grafters is established, the plutocratic ideal and agency follow
to complete their ideology.  In laying out a plutocratic ideology, Leacock is not laying out a
serious proposal for how society ought to be.  Rather, Leacock is laying bare the plutocratic
ideology so that he can satirically critique it.
The plutocrat’s ideological vision is Leacock’s jab at blind faith in classical laissez faire
economics.  Leacock had been developing a critique of laissez faire since at least his doctoral
thesis, in which he correctly calls such theories “ill work preaching a creed of half-truths and
qualified propositions” (28) that function as quasi-religious guidelines for society.  A similar
critique of laissez faire’s advocation of unrestrained, self-interested individualism is seen in the
plutocrat’s ideological vision.  With a nebulous wave of change crashing through Plutoria, the
plutocrats believe that “what was needed now was a great moral effort, to enable them to lift the
city up and carry it with them, or, if not all of it, at any rate as much of it as they could” (173).  
This vision—a society controlled by the rich, whose only moral guidepost is economic self-
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interest—exposes laissez faire economics as doctrine that is bound to leave some people behind. 
Further, the “lifting” in this vision hints that unrestrained plutocratic greed is theft.  Curiously,
the “lifting” even functions as satirical prophesy.  The lift-and-carry plutorian vision is a
foresighted jab at the economic aphorism that “a rising tide lifts all boats,” a statement of
dubious origin but popularised in the mid-twentieth century by John F. Kennedy (Sorensen 227). 
The extent to which wealth acquisition dominates all things to the plutocrats is
demonstrated by their ideology’s agency.  To lift up the city, they begin by rethinking three issues
in front of the civic government: the expropriation of the People’s Traction and Suburban
Company, the franchise renewal with the Citizens’ Light Company, and the land purchase for the
city cemetery.  Soon other plutocrats get in on the rethinking as “people began to realise the
needs of the city as they never had before” (176): coal baron Mr. Rasselyer-Brown realises he
could be selling the city coal at $5 as opposed to the current rate of $3.50; quarry and asphalt
company owner Mr. Boulder realises the city streets need work; and Mr. Skinyer of the law firm
Skinyer and Beatem realises that a $15,000 per year city solicitor is needed because the current
$6,000 per year solicitor is paid too little to be good at his job.  None of these ideas are rooted in
securing the best deal for the civic government.  Rather, they are all rooted in extracting the most
money from the civic government for the plutocrats’ own benefit.
Once Adventures spells out how the plutocrats will achieve their vision of society, the full
plutocratic ideology is laid bare.  The Plutocrats critique corrupt aldermen from a different class
of society working for their own self-interest; their ideal is a society where the rich carry the
burden of ruling and profit greatly from it; and the agency to accomplish this ideal is further
tightening plutocratic control over the dispensation of public contracts.  Just as Kernan says
about change in satire, the change that will come with plutocratic victory in the Great Fight is not
true change but rather intensification of the original conditions: the already-powerful rich will
become more powerful, and the conflicts inherent in democratic rule that the Plutorians realise
when they look up the names of the city’s aldermen will reach new levels.  This intensification is
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demonstrated well with the cemetery land purchase.
The fifty-acre plot of land originally slated for purchase by the city’s cemetery land
expropriation committee seems perfect with its “growth of cypress and evergreens and weeping
willows” (175).  Nevertheless, when the plutocrats learn about the deal they believe it is the
wrong type of land.  The $400,000 earmarked for cemetery expansion would be better-spent on
Mr. Furlong’s twenty-acre plot of barren, sandy land on the other side of the cemetery.  Its
adjoining tanneries and chemical factory make it “an ideal place.... for the dead” (175). 
Suggesting the depth to which partisans fail to see their own hypocrisy, the plutocrats even seem 
to believe Furlong’s claim that he is selling the land as an act of altruism.  They agree with his
claim that the price does not even matter, so long as it is from “four hundred thousand up.... We
didn’t regard it as a commercial transaction at all.  Our reward lay merely in the fact of selling it”
(174).  There is no doubt that the plutocrats’ preferred land is the inferior option.  However, the
inferiority of this land deal is not to say that the original land deal is conflict-free.  The superior
fifty-acre plot is owned by Alderman Schwefeldampf, the undertaker who is on the cemetery
expropriation committee.  It is never revealed how Schwefeldampf came to own this land, nor is
it known if the $400,000 price tag is reasonable, but it is wrong to simply accept that the original
$400,000 land purchase—the equivalent of $10 million today—is above reproach.  Here we see
echoes of Leacock’s point in “The Woman Question” that “the privilege of a vote confers
nothing but the right to express one’s opinion as to which of two crooks is crookeder” (150). 
Furlong’s proposed deal is definitely crooked, but Schwefeldampf’s is crooked too. 
With all the problems that are spawned by the plutocrats and their ideology, how is it
possible that these obviously “crookeder” crooks win the Great Fight for Clean Government? 
The answer is at least in part because Plutoria’s election is no time to discuss serious issues. 
When Arcadian Adventures’ final chapter moves from plutocrats speculating about city
government to plutocrats organising and campaigning to take control of city government,
ideological proposal of any kind vanishes: the plutocrats halt articulation of their ideology, there
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is no portrayal of the incumbents’ ideology, and there is no revolutionary third-party alternative
whatsoever.  In ideology’s place comes political gamesmanship and backroom organising. 
Plutoria’s Democracy in Action: There is No Alternative
When the Great Fight for Clean Government moves into formal organising and
campaigning, Leacock’s narrative eye never budges off the rich.  The absence of any
consideration of political alternatives in the climactic pages of Arcadian Adventures—from the
incumbents and especially from revolutionary socialists—speaks volumes about why Adventures
cannot be considered revolutionary.  As much as Leacock dislikes the hypocrisy of the rich, he is
even more afraid of the socialist alternative.  As Leacock warns in “What is Left of Adam
Smith,” “the wreck of Adam Smith means the triumph of socialism—a system even more
impractical than free competition” (47).  To Leacock, laissez faire free competition liberalism is
flawed, but selfish human nature leaves no practical alternative to it.  The election is an
opportunity to satirically demonstrate plutocratic excesses without giving oxygen to socialist
forces, and perhaps without being forced to take the side of the plutocrats over the socialists.  
Curiously, this no-alternative election can also be understood as a satiric continuation of a
long line of laissez faire thought.  Margaret Thatcher may have made “there is no alternative” a
conservative maxim in 1980 (McPherson), but it has been part of the libertarian vernacular since
at least 1851.  Then, Victorian philosopher Herbert Spencer invoked “there is no alternative” a
dozen times (see, for example, 105) in his dogmatically individualistic Social Statics, a book
Leacock pillories in his doctoral thesis.  Arcadian Adventures, with its extremist plutocrats,
satirically marks the midpoint between Spencer and Thatcher. 
The Great Fight cements its no-alternative narrative when the plutocrats form the Clean
Government Association.  The Association—a vehicle to achieve the plutocratic electoral
program—is created in a secret meeting to determine “exactly what they wanted to do and how
they meant to do it” (177).  With Fyshe as chairman, the plutocrats secretly assemble alongside
members of the bar and university president Dr. Boomer, who comes with three of his most
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business-friendly professors.  The general public is only invited in to a second meeting after their
“very simple” platform is settled:
As Mr. Fyshe and Mr. Boulder said there was no need to drag in specific questions or try
to define the action to be taken towards this or that particular detail, such as the hundred-
and-fifty-year franchise, beforehand.  The platform was simply expressed as Honesty,
Purity, Integrity.  This, as Mr. Fyshe said, made a straight, flat, clean issue between the
league and all who opposed it.  (180)
The Clean Government Association’s three-word platform marks the end of the already-limited
ideological proposals in Arcadian Adventures.  There is no alternative and anyone opposed to the
Association is on the opposite side of virtue.  Now the task is to win the election.
The way that the plutocrats hide their initial meeting and their program is to be frowned
upon.  However, they are not Plutoria’s only political actors guilty of hiding.  Earlier, when city
council becomes aware that a wave of change is about to sweep the city, Mayor McGrath advises
aldermen to “keep pretty dark and go easy” (171).  Once again, Leacock paints the plutocrats’
failings as universal.  Further evidencing Leacock’s tendency to paint everyone as suffering the
same moral failings is his illustration of the allure of power over the decency of principle.  Mayor
McGrath, the man whom Newberry calls “the biggest grafter of the lot” (167), joins with the
people McGrath’s supporters call “them stiffs [who want] to make trouble” (172) to become the
Association’s mayoral nominee. 
McGrath’s cooperation deal with the Association contains what appears to be the final
sliver of Adventures’ anti-revolutionary rhetoric.  It also can be seen as Adventures only
revelation—as indirect as it may be—of Leacock’s preferred alternative to American
republicanism: the British imperial system.  In a jab directed at Irish Home Rule, McGrath agrees
to toss three aldermen overboard but he “must find a place for O’Hooligan.  The Irish, he says,
don’t care for clean government; they want Irish Government” (182).  Leacock the imperialist
sees Britain as the high water mark of governance.  Keeping with Feinberg’s contention that
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satire’s implied alternatives are not very different than what the satire is criticising, it is useful to
keep in mind that imperial Britain and revolutionary America are in many ways two sides of the
same free-competition coin.  Neither country is intrinsically opposed to market-based economies. 
With the platform settled and the deal-making with the politicians in place, four factors
bring home plutocratic victory in the Great Fight.  First, the plutocrats set up a committee to
determine whether or not they need to buy up the newspapers or simply their editorial staff to
“elevate the tone of the press” (179).  The need for direct media interference falls to the wayside,
however, when the press realises that there is money to be made from jumping on the clean
government bandwagon.  Much like the plutocrats, the media’s highest principle is profit. 
Second, Mrs. Buncomhearst, who claims to represent Plutoria’s fifty thousand women voters,
“though it had never been made quite clear how or why she represented them” (185), hops on the
clean government bandwagon.  She rallies local women to the Association’s cause.  Unlike the
plutocrats and the media, Mrs. Buncomhearst’s followers appear to have no principles at all: the
scarf they make to show their political allegiance “would go with anything” (185).  The third and
fourth aspects are perhaps the most disturbing elements of the plutocratic victory.  A Students’
Fair Play League is formed at the university in support of the Association.  Students riot and
assault candidates to “put down all the hoodlumism and disturbance on the street that has hitherto
disgraced our municipal elections” (186), while the police give them a free pass to do so.  Their
efforts lead various non-League candidates to drop out.  Then on election day, anyone wishing to
cast an “unclean vote” (187) is kept away from the polls by both the students and other upper-
class professionals in the community.  With the support of Plutoria’s media, women, and
students, the plutocrats take their campaign for “Honesty, Purity, Integrity” to victory.
Irresolution and Intensification: So Much for Revolution
Brian Connery and Kirk Combe suggest that satire offers “open-endedness, irresolution,
and thus chaos” (5).  Alvin Kernan proposes that “whenever satire does have a plot which
eventuates change, it is not true change but simply intensification of the original condition” (31). 
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The closing of Arcadian Adventures with the Idle Rich exemplifies both of these observations. 
Arcadian Adventures hints at irresolution through its circular use of setting.  It opens on
Plutoria Avenue “in the softer hours of the morning” (1) and closes on Plutoria Avenue “when
the slow day broke” (189).  The descriptions of the poor on these two mornings show a degree of
open-ended irresolution.  Plutorians will continue to ignore the needs of the poor.  “You would
never know that the slums existed” (2) as Adventures opens, and as it closes the poor continue to
“[rise] to their daily toil” (189).  Clean government has done nothing for poor people, except
expose democracy as an abject failure. 
At the same time that there is open-ended irresolution shared by the opening and closing
morning of Arcadian Adventures, there is an intensification that differentiates these mornings. 
The plutocrats have gained newfound political power to further their pecuniary interests:
And as they talked, the good news spread from group to group that it was already known
that the new franchise of the Citizens’ Light was to be made for two centuries so as to
give the company a fair chance to see what it could do.  At the word of it, the grave faces
of manly bondholders flushed with pride, and the soft eyes of listening shareholders
laughed back in joy.  For they had no doubt or fear, now that clean government had come. 
They knew what the company could do.  (189)   
The plutocrats have furthered their pecuniary interests at the direct expense of the common good. 
This intensified plutocratic power, combined with the poor not seeing their situations advance,
should feed into a proletariat desire to overturn the bourgeoisie.  When viewed this way,
Arcadian Adventures seems revolutionary. 
However, even if the critique in Arcadian Adventures in general and the Great Fight for
Clean Government in particular feed into a belief that the structures of and actors in western
democracy are flawed and must be overturned, the Great Fight cannot be viewed as
revolutionary.  The book may read like a proletarian critique of the bourgeoisie, and in fact
closely resembles John Stuart Mill’s outline of that critique in Chapters on Socialism.  However,
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there simply is no ideological alternative offered within Adventures to be revolved into. 
Socialism or any other alternative is virtually absent throughout the book.  When they are briefly
present, they are ridiculed just as harshly as plutocracy. Perhaps the only revolutionary seed
planted by Adventures is that it could be read as a blueprint for a revolution from the right. 
However, that is not Adventures’ purpose and that is not the thrust of its critique.  Only the most
daft or perhaps Machiavellian reader could view Leacock’s takedown of plutocrats and their
guiding ideology as aspirational.  Adventures is an ideals- and agency-less critique, incapable of
directing a revolutionary transformation.  Just as the convergence of the theory of satire with the
theory of ideology suggests, Arcadian Adventures with the Idle Rich does not guide revolutionary
change. 
Leacock’s solution-less portrayal of democracy’s problems is also evident in Sunshine
Sketches of a Little Town.  Unlike Arcadian Adventures’ narrative eye that remains locked on
Plutoria’s idle rich to expose the poison of commercial greed and the rule of cliques, Sunshine
Sketches’ narrative eye peers over the shoulder of every person in Mariposa.  This broader
portrayal of democracy’s problems allows an understanding to be developed of just how far-
reaching Leacock sees the problems of democracy.  
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Chapter Five: Sunshine Sketches and Sweeping Self-Interest
Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town and Arcadian Adventures with the Idle Rich are often
said to be companion volumes.  While the books are not without their differences, such claims
are largely correct.  Arcadian Adventures picks up where Sunshine Sketches leaves off, in the
Mausoleum Club.  Both books deal with the economic, political, religious, and personal lives in
Mariposa and Plutoria.  And both books satirise, although with different ironic tilts, the economic
and political self-serving nature of the inhabitants of their respective communities.  As this
chapter will establish, there is another connection between Arcadian Adventures and Sunshine
Sketches to add to the list: in their critiques of western democratic systems, neither book can be
considered revolutionary.
There should be no surprise that Sunshine Sketches is not a revolutionary screed.  It is
widely agreed that Mariposa comes close to an ideal for Leacock, with a strong undercurrent that
validates Canada’s existent system of government.  Further, unlike Arcadian Adventures, which
is virtually built around a socialist/red tory critique of the rich, Sunshine Sketches is more based
in a critique of what Leacock believes the classical economists got right: humans—all
humans—are self-interested.  Consequently, Leacock’s brush paints everyone in society with
some equivalence, spreading the blame for society’s democratic failures.  The exploration of
Sunshine Sketches will reveal the omnipresence of self-interest in Sketches, how it richly colours
the critique of democracy, and how it largely undermines the specific ideal of a democratically-
controlled socialist society.  Further, just as with Arcadian Adventures, it will be seen that the
critique in Sunshine Sketches offers no alternatives. 
Sunshine Sketches’ Structural Validation of Western Governance 
Sunshine Sketches’ anti-revolutionary nature can be seen in its structural frames.  As
Gerald Lynch outlines in “From Serial to Book: Leacock’s Revisions to Sunshine Sketches of a
Little Town,” Sunshine Sketches is built around two frames.  The opening preface and the closing
sketch, “L’Envoi,” form an exterior authorial frame, allowing Sunshine Sketches to begin with
69
Leacock’s personal introduction and to close with Leacock’s moralising about how we relate to
our roots.  Internal to the authorial frame is the thematic frame.  Sketches 1, 2, 10, and 11
construct the economic and political systems of Mariposa.  These four sketches exhibit a central
belief of Leacock’s: the importance of the economic and the political to framing society (Lynch
“From Serial to Book” 105).  Nestled within these two frames are seven sketches about the
personal and religious lives of Mariposans.  
Looked at another way, the outer frame is Leacock’s seal of approval, the inner frame
seals the lives of Mariposans around a stable structure of market-based western liberal
democracy.  Safely inside, Mariposans are free to live, love, work, and worship as they please. 
Especially in their interpersonal relationships, Mariposans are decent people who—while not
without folly—more often than not avoid major interpersonal conflicts.  Judge Pepperleigh
genuinely cares for his wife; Zena Pepperleigh and Peter Pupkin genuinely court one-another; Dr.
Gallagher and Dean Drove respectfully though perhaps not productively navigate their genuine
interests in conflicting narratives of history; and even the narrator, when given the chance to
speak ill of Jefferson Thorpe, genuinely believes “there’s no need to go into that” (30).  
The interpersonal decency of Mariposans noted, the town exists in a peculiar stasis. 
While there is much going on in Mariposa, not much actually changes.  This is consistent with
satire’s tendency towards irresolution.  As R. D. Macdonald observes, “Leacock consistently
celebrates the villagers’ unintended return, their circling back to their point of origin” (95). 
While Leacock is just as much critiquing as he is celebrating these unintended returns,
Macdonald is right.  Mariposans are not going anywhere.  The interior goings-on are stable and
the exterior frames offer stability.  To the point of revolution, nowhere in Sunshine Sketches is
the economic and political frame put under serious threat, nowhere in Sunshine Sketches does the
economic and political frame seriously threaten Mariposans, and nowhere in Sunshine Sketches
do Mariposans seriously threaten to break out of the economic and political frame.  If judged
solely by its frames, Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town is not a revolutionary book.  It represents
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a stable society.
Nevertheless, Sunshine Sketches does exert serious satirical pressure on democracy.  The
critique is broad-based.  Mariposa’s member of parliament stands for everything, his main
opponent is an illiterate opportunist, and the voters are only moved by ignorant self-interest. 
Whereas Adventures primarily focusses on the rule of cliques and interests and bosses, alongside
the insidious poison of commercial greed, Sketches goes further.  It puts particular emphasis on
genial incompetents popular as spendthrifts, crooked partisans warm to their friends and bitter to
their enemies, and administration by a party for a party.  With much of Sketches revolving around
one economically self-interested man—but concurrently painting all individuals as economically
self-interested—understanding its approach to democracy requires an understanding of its
predominant character and Conservative candidate for parliament, Josh Smith.  
Josh Smith: Illiterate Saloon-Keeper, Candidate for Parliament
If there is anything resembling a story arc in Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town, it is Josh
Smith’s rise to prominence in Mariposa.  Smith, Sketches’ predominant character (aside from the
intrusive narrator), is a shrewd but illiterate businessperson.  This 280-pound “over-dressed
pirate” is established early-on as “no ordinary man”: 
It is not merely his costume, though the chequered waistcoat of dark blue with a flowered
pattern forms, with his shepherd’s plaid trousers, his grey spats and patent-leather boots, a
colour scheme of no mean order.  Nor is it merely Mr. Smith’s finely mottled face.  The
face, no doubt, is a notable one,—solemn, inexpressible, unreadable, the face of the
heaven-born hotel keeper.  It is more than that.  It is the strange dominating personality of
the man that somehow holds you captive.  I know nothing in history to compare with the
position of Mr. Smith among those who drink over his bar, except, though in a lesser
degree, the relation of the Emperor Napoleon to the Imperial Guard.  (13-14)
Smith’s bigger-than-life leadership role in Mariposa makes Sketches something of a picaresque
narrative.  As M. H. Abrams observes, the picaresque is episodic and often satiric, typically
71
concerning “the escapades of an insouciant rascal who lives by his wits and shows little if any
alteration of character through the long succession of his adventures” (191).  Picaresque Smith
has a role in or is the focus of many sketches, succeeding in Mariposa’s temperately-veneered
business community, saving the town’s sinking steamer and financially-floundering church, and
ultimately leveraging his wits to take a seat in parliament under the Conservative banner.  
Josh Smith’s character is rooted in two real-life people.  According to Gerald Lynch, he is
a representation of Orillia hotelier Jim Smith, as well as a “joshing” representation of Adam
Smith (“From Serial to Book” 109).  The connection to Jim Smith is indisputable, since 
Leacock’s draft notes on Sketches connect the two men (Spadoni 180).  The connection to Adam
Smith is on stable ground.  Leacock put considerable academic efforts into deconstructing Adam
Smith’s theory of markets and self-interest, and Josh Smith is the self-interested representative of
Mariposa’s business community.  Further evidencing that Josh Smith is meant to be a joshing
representation of Adam Smith, the character is one of only a few that did not experience a name
change when the book was adapted from its original serialisation in the Montreal Star.  Most
others were given new names, to obscure their real-life inspirations (Lynch “From Serial to
Book” 109).  If the Adam Smith-based character of Sunshine Sketches is a picaresque “hero,” this
does little to cement the narrative as revolutionary.
To call Smith a “hero,” even in quotation marks, may not please all analysts of Sunshine
Sketches.  Smith is characterised by Lynch as a “masterfully-deceptive interloper: he moves into
Mariposa, exploits its deluded residents, and by the end of the eleventh sketch is on his way out” 
(Humour and Humanity 61-62).  Antor’s characterisation is kinder, calling Smith a “shrewd
pragmatist” (56).  Davies is perhaps the kindest, characterising Smith as “plainly the ablest man
in Mariposa... the leader who will always rise above the commonality, whatever his want of
education or principle” (21-22).  Within their frames of analysis, each of these perspectives holds
validity.  Yet, given the Horatian nature of Sunshine Sketches, Antor’s interpretation of Smith as
a shrewd pragmatist may be the most applicable to the present analysis.  Even if Smith cannot be
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held up as a paragon of virtue, and even if Smith is something of an outsider to Mariposa, his
exploits are relatively harmless and most of them offer some economic benefit to Mariposans. 
To be sure, Smith, alongside all the actors in Mariposa’s market-based democracy, are
ridiculous.  But it is difficult to contend that they are evil people, and the system that they are in
seems to work for them.  Viewed this way, Sketches is not so much satirising Mariposa as it is
satirising how self-interest manifests itself in Mariposa, primarily with concern to the political
and the economic.  As the book progresses, Smith succeeds largely through his ability to intersect
his own self-interest with the self-interest of all Mariposans.  The success of Smith’s brand of
self-interest for all underpins an anti-revolutionary current in Sunshine Sketches, standing in
direct contrast to the socialist belief in the toxicity of self-interested business interests.  
The Universality of Self Interest in Mariposa
Josh Smith’s method of advancing his own self-interest by catering to the self-interest of
others begins when he arrives in Mariposa and takes over a hotel.  Smith does not resort to
naming his hotel with “feeble” (14) names like the Alexandria, the Queen’s, or the Royal Hotel. 
Smith merely puts up a sign that reads “JOS. SMITH, PROP.” and then stands “underneath in the
sunshine as a living proof that a man who weighs nearly three hundred pounds is the natural king
of the hotel business” (14).  Smith, as the public face of his business, functions as a symbolic
throwback to when the concept of the market in practice generally meant that the players had
personal relationships with one another.  In this sense, “JOS. SMITH, PROP.” is not just the
name on the hotel: it is disclosure to the community of with whom they are dealing.  That said, in
a town of 5,000, most would know the hotel proprietors whether or not their names are on the
buildings, so Smith’s move is more a manipulative act of ego and personal image-building than it
is an act of fair-minded disclosure.  Regardless, given the symbolic relationship between Adam
Smith and Josh Smith, the parallel remains a noteworthy endorsement of business being open
and accessible to its customers.
When setting up shop, Smith comes under pressure from the clergy and other Mariposan
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prohibitionists for serving liquor.  The scorn is hypocritical: these same opponents accept the
beverage rooms at the Mariposa House and Continental as “a necessary and useful evil” (19),
sometimes drinking there themselves.  To win over Mariposa, Smith resorts to seeming
philanthropy.  His first philanthropic act takes place when a steam merry-go-round sets down in a
lot next to the hotel.  Smith gives the operator $10 to provide children with free rides all evening. 
The result is $40 in lager sales alone, as parents drop off their children and drink at Smith’s. 
This scheme is how Smith learned “the blessedness of giving” (20).  From here, Smith’s giving
grows.  Smith joins every local board and association, especially those which “needed premises
to meet in and grew thirsty in their discussions” (20).  In fact, when a half-baked whirlwind
campaign sweeps through Mariposa to raise funds for the church, Smith is Mariposa’s biggest
benefactor—church included—when he donates on the condition that the fundraising committee
holds their meetings in his hotel.  But Smith also engages in “secret benefactions, the kind of
giving done by stealth of which not a soul in town knew anything, often, for a week after it was
done” (20).  His “secret” benefactors include the church and the Conservative party.  Let there be
no mistake: such schemes are foremostly designed for the interest of Smith’s business, not the
interest of the community.  However, community interest is corollary to Smith’s self-interest, as
Mariposans benefit from his giving.  Further, Mariposans choose with free will to be participants
in these benefactions.  Parents choose to drink at the hotel while their children ride the merry-go-
round; community groups choose to meet and eat at the hotel; politicians choose to accept
Smith’s donations.  Scheming?  Absolutely.  But so transparent are these schemes that it would
be—or at least ought to be—obvious to Mariposans that they are being played.  Leacock’s satire
is thus double-edged: Smith’s giving is self-interested, but Mariposans accept this giving out of
self-interest, failing to raise objections or express any critique of its nature.  In other words,
Leacock is painting everyone as equivalents.  Nobody in Mariposa is virtuously selfless.  
Smith’s scheming delves into the illegal when it comes to liquor laws.  His practice is to
“close” the bar not at the legislated hour, but rather when the bar is “properly full” (15).  The bar
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is not properly full bar until Judge Pepperleigh and the prosecuting attorney Macartney are inside
it.  Smith not respecting the law is on some level problematic.  But Judge Pepperleigh is not
respecting the law, either, nor are Smith’s other patrons.  It is worth remembering here Leacock’s
vehement anti-prohibitionist stance.  When Leacock claims that with regard to liquor laws, “Mr.
Smith’s moral code was simplicity itself,—do what is right and take the consequences” (21),
Leacock is saying that Smith (and the townsfolk) are morally right to circumvent liquor laws. 
Judge Pepperleigh’s presence only adds weight to this perception.  But even if Mariposans are
doing what is right, they are not motivated by what is right.  Rather, they are motivated to take
the consequences of doing what is right: for Smith it is profit; for Mariposans it is liquor.  Even
on a matter of principle, self-interest strikes again. 
Leacock, on the other hand, is motivated in at least some small part by a sense of what is
right.  Of course, as a drinker Leacock’s self-interest in laying out the town as morally right to
imbibe cannot go unmentioned.  However, Leacock views excessive liquor regulation in general
and prohibition in particular to be inherently illiberal.  He points out in a pamphlet What
Prohibition Does that “it violates the first principles of individual freedom on which the
greatness of British institutions has been based.”  Leacock’s more detailed “The Tyranny of
Prohibition,” written after the United States passed the Eighteenth Amendment that banned
alcohol, explores the illiberal nature of prohibition.  Leacock is broad-minded enough to
acknowledge that within the prohibition movement, there is a subset of good people who actually
believe that “they are doing the work of Christ on earth” (66).  Wryly, Leacock invokes the
Spanish Inquisition when adds that they are entitled to do religious work, “along with
Torquemada and Philip of Spain” (66).  Foundationally, though, Leacock sees in the Eighteenth
Amendment the victory of a tyrannical minority.  His critique of prohibitionists’ political
mobbing of the majority is still relevant:
Thus in the matter of real rule the politician is nowhere.  His only aim is to give the
public what the public wants or at least what the public seems to ask for.  And the
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politician has heard apparently only a single voice.  On the one hand were the
prohibitionists—articulate, strident, fanatical, highly organized, amply supplied with
money, with the name of religion upon their lips, ready at a moment’s notice to lash
themselves into a fit of hysteria, and to attack with overwhelming force the personal
fortunes and the political position of anyone who should dare oppose them.  On the other
side was the general public, the vast majority of whom were, and are, opposed to national
prohibition, but among whom no individual, or at best only one or two in thousands, were
prepared to take the risk of open opposition to the relentless and fanatical minority.  (65)
Leacock sees in the prohibitionist movement a direct threat to liberalism, because he believes
societal consensus is being overridden not by reason but by fear.  Smith, as the man willing to
stand against liquor regulation—admittedly in an act of self-interest—thus becomes a champion
of liberalism, and by extension the upholder of principles that Leacock says underpin the
greatness of British institutions.  If the “hero” of Sunshine Sketches is a defender of British-style
liberalism, he is an anti-revolutionary in his own right.  
When Smith faces the loss of his liquor license—not from the temperance movement but
rather from a temperamental judicial decision—he is able to use the universality of self-interest
to overcome this tyranny.  On a fateful night, Judge Pepperleigh and the prosecuting attorney
Macartney are accidentally locked out of the hotel.  Within days, Smith receives a three-month
notice of the revocation of his liquor license.  Prior to this, the harshest Pepperleigh had ever
been on Smith was a $100 fine for serving after hours, after discovering Smith donated to the
Liberal party.  Realising he needs to curry monumental favour with Mariposans to save the
license, Smith quickly adds facilities onto the hotel that “no one in Mariposa had ever seen” (23):
a French café he calls the “caff” and a German ratskeller he calls the “Rats’ Cooler” (22), staffed
with a French chef and German waiter brought in from the city.  Smith proceeds to obscenely
under-charge for food and drink.  Mariposans eat (and drink) it up: “men would sit in the caff at
lunch perhaps for an hour and a half and talk about the licence question in general, and then go
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down into the Rats’ Cooler and talk about it for two hours more” (25).  Public opinion—ranging
from the newspaper editors to prohibitionists and even to Judge Pepperleigh—becomes that out-
of-town liquor commissioners have no business taking the license from such a fine local
establishment.  That, as Smith points out to his assistant Billy, “every one of them hogs eats
about a dollar’s worth a grub for every twenty-five cents they pay on it” (25), certainly
incentivises public opinion.  A massive lobbying effort ensues, saving Smith’s license.  With the
license saved, Smith raises prices, sends the chef and waiter packing, and “temporarily” closes
the Rats’ Cooler for repairs.  Once again the satire surrounding Smith is double-edged.  Surely
these self-interested “hogs” ought to have seen through Smith’s actions.  Smith, however, is able
to exploit other people’s self-interest to advance his own self-interest, even in a community that
houses prohibitionists who had preached against Smith’s liquor sales when he first arrived in
town.  Thus, in the first of the sketches, Smith’s scheming benefits the town, booms his own
business, and keeps liquor flowing.  Smith, in other words, is the ultimate liberal genius. 
Smith’s scheming moves deep into the realm of criminal when he saves Mariposa’s
Church of England church from creditors.  The Reverend Dean Drone’s vanity project of
replacing the old stone building with a large wooden structure drives the church to the financial
brink.  Little attention to or understanding of the cost of the replacement is exhibited by Drone or
Mariposans.  Leacock brilliantly captures their inabilities by piling up mixed metaphors: 
I don’t think that at first anybody troubled much about the debt on the church.  Dean
Drone’s figures showed that it was only a matter of time before it would be extinguished;
only a little effort was needed, a little girding up of the loins of the congregation and they
could shoulder the whole debt and trample it under their feet.  Let them but set their
hands to the plough and they could soon guide it into the deep water.  Then they might
furl their sails and sit every man under his own olive tree.  (68)
As Dean Drone and Mariposa at large blunder through a series of failed fundraisers, interest piles
up on the debt until it becomes unmanageable.  Salvation comes, but not from the people of
77
Mariposa.  Nor does it come from an act of God.  Salvation comes from arson.  With the church
burned to the ground, insurance resolves all of the Church of England Church’s financial woes.
While the cause of the fire is never officially determined, Smith was seen walking
towards the church on the night of the fire, tin of kerosene in hand.  This leads the insurance
company to dispute the claim, but the allegations against Smith are “amply disproved by the
proceedings of the court... and that anyway it was the rottenest kind of kerosene he had ever seen
and no more use than so much molasses” (90).  Judge Pepperleigh rules in favour of the church,
and “I am quoting here the text of the decision—against the intrigues of a set of infernal skunks
that make too much money, anyway” (90).  The fire not only saves the church from bankruptcy,
but it also makes Smith the town’s hero—not through the virtue of being an arsonist, but as a
result of his frantic firefighting skills that keep the blaze from spreading from the church’s
driving shed to the rest of town.  Of course, Smith would be highly motivated to keep the fire
contained to the church, lest he be the man who burned down all of Mariposa, his own hotel
included.
The arson departs from Leacock’s previous satire of Smith’s schemes in many ways. 
Unlike Smith’s earlier schemes, the real target of the arson—the insurance company—does not
part with its money through free will.  As well, Leacock moves beyond the running satire about
Mariposans who ought to be aware.  Mariposans are aware.  Smith, after all, is seen walking
towards the church with a tin of kerosene the very night it burns down.  Yet everyone—the
church’s Dean, the town’s judge, and Mariposans in general—choose to ignore the facts.  They
collectively act in the community’s self-interest at the expense of “skunks that make too much
money anyway.”  Why does Leacock let Smith off?  There are at least two reasons.  First, in
contrast to how the churches in Arcadian Adventures fall to financial interests, the arson prevents
Mariposa’s church from coming under the control of its creditors and, by extension, financial
interests.  Given Leacock’s belief that religion forms the basis of society’s moral code (“Devil
and the Deep Blue Sea” 45), Smith’s act of arson keeps pecuniary hands from controlling
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Mariposa’s moral code.  Second, Mariposa’s bond as a community in a moment of crisis speaks
to Leacock’s belief in organic community.  To Leacock, self-interest can extend beyond
individuals, since the “plain assertion that every man looks out for himself (or at best for himself
and his immediate family) touches the tender conscience of humanity” (Unsolved Riddle 40). 
Mariposa, as a community and family, uses its collectivity to protect its own and deliver a
comeuppance to the insurance company, an outside institution that makes too much money on
their backs.  As a whole, Smith being let off for torching the church is consistent with Leacock’s
longstanding intemperance for narrowly individualistic greed and exploitative accumulation of
wealth, along with his red tory belief in organic community. 
The insurance fraud also acts as a corrective to an earlier episode of Mariposa being
burned by outsiders.  When “everybody went simply crazy” (29) over mining stocks, barber
Jefferson Thorpe becomes rich by stubbornly holding onto Northern Star mine stock.  However,
just as quickly as Thorpe becomes rich, he loses his fortune on an obviously-fraudulent Cuban
plantation investment scheme that “made no rash promises, just admitted straight out that the
enterprise might realise 400 percent, or might conceivably make less.  There was no hint of
more” (38).  When the Cuban scheme goes bust, it is not just Thorpe who loses out.  In an
atypical act of financial selflessness, Thorpe says his plan is to donate much of his windfall to
charitable causes, most likely a home for incurables.  The donation’s failure to come to fruition is
perhaps a statement about the unattainability of true, selfless charity.
For Smith, the Cuban plantation episode finds him at his most paternal.  He saves his
clerk Billy from falling prey to the scheme by refusing to pay back wages that Billy wants to
invest in it.  Further, when Thorpe goes bust, Smith contracts with Thorpe’s hen-raising wife to
buy eggs for the hotel, ensuring that “things are not so bad” (42) for them.  Keeping with
Sketches’ anti-revolutionary undercurrent, Thorpe’s financial misadventure demonstrates the
positive role that private business plays in societies where people have mutual responsibility. 
While Mariposans are burned by outside business interests, Smith looks out for his own.
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Josh Smith is the master manipulator of mutual self-interest.  His successful business
tactics, centred on building his own self-interest by serving the self-interest of others, work as a
potent counter to the socialist solution of collective ownership to ensure fairness in society. 
Smith does “more to boom Mariposa than any ten men in town” (26), preserving and promoting
liberalism all while keeping liquor flowing, helping the Thorpes in their financial recovery,
salvaging the church from financial ruin, and supporting virtually every charity and community
organisation in Mariposa.  This is to say nothing of Smith saving the Mariposa Belle when it
sinks to the shallow bottom of Lake Wissanotti, a rescue coloured by pecuniary motives: Smith
does it on twenty-five dollar bet (58).  Ostensibly, Smith causes no positive harm to Mariposans,
but rather delivers them benefits while achieving his own self-interest.  Unlike the plutocrats of
Arcadian Adventures, who use liberalism to pursue their own goals at the expense of broader
society, it is difficult to build a case for overthrowing Smith’s brand of liberalism.  
Josh Smith’s positive attributes noted, let there be no mistake that all the schemes in
Sunshine Sketches are worthy of ridicule.  After all, satire’s purpose is to critique.  Is it really
charity if a hotelier donates on the condition that the donations be spent at his private business? 
Probably not.  Can it really be okay for almost an entire town—judiciary included—to openly
flout liquor laws?  Doubtful.  Should eyes be turned away when a church is burned to the ground
for the insurance money?  Of course not.  Mariposans may be better than Plutorians, but they are
not selfless.  This is the satiric frame—if not the satiric heart—of Sunshine Sketches: even in
Leacock’s supposedly ideal community, people navigate political and economic realms with self-
interest.  As Feinberg says, satire exposes the folly in believing that humans are “motivated by
the ideal, the moral, the good, never by the actual, the immoral, the evil” (ITS 23).  Mariposa may
be an ideal for Leacock, but it is not a moral utopia.  
Between its strong anti-revolutionary undercurrent and its almost-laudatory critique of
self-interest in a liberal society, Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town is not a manifesto for change. 
Just as satire theory states, Sketches critiques existing conditions but does not propose an
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alternative.  Keeping with this aspect of satire theory, when it is finally time for “The Great
Election in Missinaba County,” the election is not a conflict of ideologies, but rather an orgy of
self-interest.  Facts are thrown aside in favour of meaningless statistics, candidates embrace
shady electioneering tactics, and voters neglect the public interest.  Sketches’ exposé of elections
casts a darker hue on self-interest’s ubiquitous nature, but continues with the book’s tendency to
avoid proposing alternatives. 
An Orgy of Self-Interest on Everyone’s Behalf: The Great Election
The two climactic sketches of Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town, “The Great Election in
Missinaba County” and “The Candidacy of Mr. Smith,” recount the election in Mariposa and the
surrounding Missinaba County.  For simplicity’s sake, both sketches will collectively be referred
to as the Great Election.  Although it is a federal election—historian Jack Granatstein describes it
in Yankee Go Home as the “definitive analysis” (43) of Canada’s 1911 reciprocity election—the
narrator paints it as representative of almost any election.  “Don’t ask me what election it was,
whether Dominion or Provincial or Imperial or Universal,” the election narrative opens, “for I
scarcely know” (127).  From the get-go, Leacock’s suggestion is that the antics in Mariposa’s
Great Election are universal to any election campaign.  
In the Great Election, there are three categories of voters: Liberals, Conservatives, and
those who are both.  People who are both “vote Liberal or Conservative according to their
judgment of the questions of the day.  If their judgment of these questions tells them that there is
something in it for them in voting Liberal, then they do so” (130).  Declared Liberals and
Conservatives are more partisan, able to “decide the most complicated question in four seconds:
in fact, just as soon as they grab the city papers out of the morning mail, they know the whole
solution of any problem you can put to them” (130).  Partisans are worse than those who shop
around to serve their self-interest, insofar as they fail to reach across divides in heated political
moments, in what is otherwise a community of decent people.  During campaigns, partisans leave
their church pews if the preachings are contrary to their politics.  Even close relationships falter
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in the face of partisanship: Dr. Gallagher and dentist Joe Milligan stop sharing their motorboat,
and Pete Glover and Alf McNichol split apart their hardware and paint selling operations.  The
town’s most notorious partisan, however, is Judge Pepperleigh.  His politics deeply colour him in
and out of writ periods.  There is no shortage of partisan offences committed by Pepperleigh, and
perhaps the worst is when he lets his son Neil off “without a stain on upon your name” (95) for
smashing the face of Peter McGinnis, the Liberal organiser.  Though tribal, Liberal and
Conservative partisans still work towards their own self-interest.  Leacock himself touches on
this as early as the preface, when he claims that despite his own membership in the Conservative
Party, “as yet I have failed entirely in Canadian politics, never having received a contract to build
a bridge, or make a wharf, nor to construct even the smallest section of the Transcontinental
Railway” (4).  Even the few Mariposans with no politics whatsoever are not left off the self-
interest hook, for their position leaves others to “wonder what it is that he is ‘out after’” (132).  
Self-interest is the basis upon which Liberal incumbent Henry Bagshaw hopes to fight the
campaign.  Bagshaw fancies himself an everyman, owning farmland and town property,
subscribing to pews at several churches, and even keeping a “little account in one bank and a big
account in the other, so that he was a rich man or a poor man at the same time” (132).  When
Bagshaw learns that the Liberals in Ottawa want to frame the campaign around trade reciprocity
with the United States, he laments “Why they can’t fight it merely on the question of graft?”
(134).  If the ballot question is graft, Bagshaw’s plan is to leak to the papers that “we bribed all
the voters in the county, and that we gave out enough contracts to simply pervert the whole
constituency.... we poured the public money into this county in bucketsful and... we are bound to
do it again” (134).  Leaving Mariposans to believe that he will fill every constituent’s pocket,
Bagshaw contends, is a certain path to victory.
Henry Bagshaw’s main challenger is Josh Smith.  Even though Smith represents the
Conservatives, he falls into the category of those who are both Liberal and Conservative.  Smith,
after all, donates to both parties.  It is never revealed why Smith chooses the Conservative
82
banner, though it must be due to the difficulties independent candidates face, the fact that there is
a Liberal incumbent, and simply because Smith is the book’s ironic hero and Leacock is a
Conservative.  When Smith decides to run, he replaces American drinks in his hotel with British
beer and Irish whiskey, he drapes the building with Union Jacks, and he orders fifty pictures of
King George, fifty pictures of George’s father Albert, and “while you’re at it, get some of the old
Queen, Victorina” (137).  Best illustrating Smith’s directionless political allegiances, once the
Union Jack is flying over his hotel, “he stood and watched the flag fluttering in the wind” (137).  
Broadly, Bagshaw and Smith represent Leacock’s beliefs about democracy’s tendency to
elect people who are not the most upright actors.  As he says in Elements of Political Science,
Election is apt to favor the candidates who possess in a high degree the more popular arts,
who have a readiness, or even a ready buffoonery in speech, who are not sensitive to
political abuse, and who have a reputation (military, for example) calculated to appeal to
the imagination of the crowd.  (165)
In contrast to this pessimistic diagnosis stands the election’s independent candidate, Edward
Drone.  Edward, the brother of Dean Drone, runs on a platform of “just simple honesty and
public morality” (134).  Drone’s interest in and respect for the theoretical roots of democracy
leads Mariposans to believe that with “his political ideas Edward Drone was and, as everybody in
Mariposa knew, always had been crazy” (135).  While Drone’s independent candidacy represents
change, the change is not an all-out revolutionary proposal for systemic, institutional
reconstruction.  Rather, Drone is interested in bringing honesty and morality into public life.  His
periodic appearances in the campaign illustrate Leacock’s belief that “there are in every
community many men of very great talent, conspicuous perhaps in science or literature, who
would never be elected at the polls” (Elements 165).  His campaign represents an unachievable
ideal that actors in a democracy will serve nothing but the public interest, and his defeat is treated
as a foregone conclusion. 
In addition to Edward Drone’s candidacy, there is one truly revolutionary political
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alternative that receives a marginalised appearance in Sketches.  The sketches just prior to the
election campaign follow the courtship of Peter Pupkin and Zena Pepperleigh.  Pupkin—a teller
at the Exchange Bank—is unable to marry due to a peculiar rule held by banks of the day. 
Employees could only marry if their salary was a minimum level.  With Pupkin’s salary $200 shy
of the Exchange Bank’s $1,000 marriage threshold, he views himself as a victim of capitalism’s
grinding tyranny.  Despondent, Pupkin takes interest in revolutionary movements: “Russian
Anarchism, German Socialism, the Labour Movement, Henry George, Lloyd George,—he
understood the whole lot of them by thinking of his two hundred dollars” (108).  Pupkin’s
flirtation with revolution, however, is brief.
As Sketches’ closest encounter with revolution, Leacock discounts Pupkin and his
revolutionary zeal in four ways.  First, Leacock puts Pupkin’s judgment in question.  Pupkin
tends to jump to conclusions, such as his incorrect belief that Zena is falling in love with a
visiting poet; he is unable to win intellectual debates with Mallory Tompkins, the Times-Herald
reporter who was “so intellectual that he was, as he himself admitted, a complete eggnostic” (98);
and he is constantly on the verge of suicide though lacking the will to act.  Second, Pupkin finds
himself achieving the $1,000 salary threshold not long after he starts at the bank.  This quick
resolution suggests that time and not revolution is what will resolve perceived tyrannies of
capitalism.  Third, Leacock uses Pupkin to plant a seed about the danger of revolutionary
movements on the impressionable young.  During the peak of his frustration, “Pupkin read
Memoirs of the Great Revolutionists and even thought of blowing up [bank manager] Henry
Mullins with dynamite” (108).  That said, Pupkin’s fear of death makes him ill-suited to lead a
violent revolution.  Fourth, Leacock uses Pupkin to undermine the idea that revolution is about
social solidarity.  Pupkin’s motivations are firmly planted in self-interest, and not in a broader
perception of societal injustice.  Never does Pupkin consider anybody but himself and his own
plight in his revolutionary thoughts. 
As a whole, there is a message in Pupkin’s ordeal about capitalism pushing people too
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far.  However, Sketches does not portray capitalism as a purveyor of grinding injustice, needing
to be overturned.  Instead, Pupkin’s revolutionary rumblings are a simplistic young man’s
grumblings, whose problems are resolved within the existent political and economic system.  As
Sketches’ revolutionary, Pupkin embodies Leacock’s belief at the time that “there is no socialist
peril.... Society is moving neither to a revolution nor a catastrophe” (“Socialism and the Future”
5).  And just as Pupkin’s fleeting revolutionary feelings fade away, so too does the idea of
revolution in Sunshine Sketches.  Where Pupkin’s story ends, the Great Election begins.  In this
election, there is no truly revolutionary candidate on offer, despite the scattered appearance of
radical third parties on Canada’s federal electoral scene in the early 20th century.  The election,
rather, is an examination of the temperament and self-interest of voters and politicians alike.
In the Great Election, Leacock goes out of his way to portray voters as pliable and
politicians—especially Bagshaw and Smith—as manipulative.  When Bagshaw arrives in
Mariposa, where he spends no more than two months a year, he buys “nails and putty and glass
in the hardware store, and harness in the harness shop, and drugs in the drug store and toys in the
toy shop, and all the things like that that are needed for a big campaign” (133).  Each candidate’s
promotional banners indicate the angles they will use to harness and ply the voters: “SMITH
AND BRITISH ALLEGIANCE” read the Conservative banners, “BAGSHAW AND LIBERTY,
BAGSHAW AND PROSPERITY, VOTE FOR THE OLD MISSINABA STANDARD
BEARER” read the Liberal banners, and “DRONE AND HONESTY” reads the single Drone
banner that the wind carries away into the lake.  Even though the election’s main issue is trade
reciprocity with the United States, never does substantive or informed discussion on
reciprocity—or any other issue, for that matter—take place.  
Trade reciprocity is initially framed as a zero sum game of resistance or capitulation to
the United States.  Even though Leacock is a protectionist and imperialist, Sketches happily
points out the hyperbolic nature of the protectionist side of the debate, claiming that
it was a huge election and that on it turned issues of the most tremendous importance,
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such as whether or not Mariposa should become part of the United States, and whether
the flag that had waved over Tecumseh Township for ten centuries should be trampled
under the hoof of an alien invader, and whether Britons should be slaves, and whether the
farming class would prove themselves Canadians.  (127)
Hyperbole, it is shown, is more suited to capturing public imagination than any substantive, fact-
based debate.  Nowhere is this more apparent than in the way trade statistics are bandied about. 
It is blazingly obvious that no Mariposan has the slightest idea what any statistic really means,
including the candidates.  What everyone does know, however, is that “people lived on figures of
this sort, and the man who could remember most of them stood out as a born leader” (142). 
Further, the bigger the statistic, the better.  When Bagshaw delivers a parochial speech on local
barley and hay prices, absurdly framed as a speech about the national interest, “it was felt that a
Liberal vote in Tecumseh Township was a foregone conclusion” (142).  Seeing that Bagshaw’s
campaign is “beating us on them statissicks.  Ourn ain’t good enough” (142), Smith simply jacks
up his numbers to regain momentum.
Smith is equally daft with “statissicks” as he is with the substance of any issue.  At best,
he finds himself on all sides of almost everything.  He gives vapid answers to local reporters,
which they spin to their own suiting, influenced no doubt by Smith plying them with alcohol; his
position on imperial defence is to defer to the federal party; and he is both for and against trade
reciprocity, depending upon the audience.  But Smith’s greatest flip-flop comes with his position
on temperance and total prohibition.  Saloon-keeping Smith running on prohibition is a damning
statement about politicians exchanging their principles for power, and his ever-changing position
shows just how willingly politicians change their positions to gain power.  When Smith brings a
prohibitionist speaker to Mariposa, the speaker warns his audience that Bagshaw’s campaign
meeting is stocked with whiskey, and “every single man that attends that meeting,—mark my
words, every single man,—will drink his fill of the abominable stuff at the expense of the Liberal
candidate!” (144).  The news empties out the room, and Smith sees the flag fluttering in the
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wind.  He abandons his manifesto’s prohibition plank:
in favour of such a form of restrictive license as should promote temperance while
encouraging the manufacture of spirituous liquors, and by a severe regulation of the
liquor traffic should place intoxicants only in the hands of those fitted to use them.  (144)
Smith’s new position ensures that prohibitionists are appeased, and drinkers’ concerns are eased,
a move typical of the equivocation that marks so much of Sunshine Sketches.  Recall Griffin’s
and Bogel’s beliefs that satire can allow for the exploration of what it means to take any position
whatsoever.  Smith in his election campaign and the narrator in general demonstrate how difficult
it is to take a firm stance, hence their equivocations.  There are loud echoes here of Leacock’s
admiration for Charles II, particularly his understanding that no opinion is altogether right and no
purpose is altogether laudable. 
While Josh Smith busies himself equivocating on most every issue, Henry Bagshaw
busies himself casting shade on Smith.  His conjecture-filled speech pillorying Smith makes for
good reading, and Bagshaw would want it repeated.  But there’s no need to go into that.  The
speech should “go down in history, and so it will,—ever so far down” (141).  Bagshaw’s
willingness to be un-Mariposan and disparage Smith shows that his long absences from Mariposa
have left him out of touch with the community.  Conversely, Smith’s electoral victory
demonstrates that he knows Mariposans better than Bagshaw.  That said, Bagshaw’s speech
should probably be understood above all as Leacock’s diagnosis of the toxicity of partisanship. 
As Leacock says in My Discovery of the West, “we need first of all an ardent purpose to make
things better.  I do not think this can be done by intensifying party politics” (255).  In Mariposa,
those who are neighbours and friends outside of writ periods turn into polarised partisans during
campaigns.  Degenerating into polarised camps is hardly an ardent purpose for a community, and
Bagshaw’s partisan speech does nothing to make things better. 
The exception to this whole sorrowful display of ignorance, muckraking, and self-interest
is Edward Drone.  Of course, Drone is the candidate whom voters reject en masse:
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Here and there you might see Edward Drone, the Independent candidate, wandering round
from farm to farm in the dust of the political buggies.  To each of the farmers he
explained that he pledged himself to give no bribes, to spend no money and to offer no
jobs, and each one of them gripped him warmly by the hand and showed him the way to
the next farm.  (141) 
Drone’s campaign stays consistent with Leacock’s satire of Mariposan self-interest.  When given
the ballot-box option of a moral alternative who wishes to eschew dispensing favour, Mariposans
choose to reject it out of narrow self-interest. 
Come election day, Drone and Bagshaw are each briefly thought to be winning the polls. 
Drone is the first reported to be in the lead.  The reports cause Mariposans to inundate Drone
with requests for favours, jobs, and other sinecures dispensed through public office.  Here,
Leacock hints at the inescapably corrupting nature of power and politics.  Even though Drone
insists to his suitors that he “had to consult his colleagues and not merely follow the dictates of
his own wishes” (147), already he “was beginning to feel something of what it meant to hold
office and there was creeping into his manner the quiet self-importance which is the first sign of
conscious power” (146).  Perhaps, then, Mariposa’s rejection of Drone—the only hope for
changing government for the better—may have been the right decision.  Why should self-
interested Mariposa miss out on government largesse in the short-term, if in the long-term a
return to the status quo is inevitable?  For Mariposa, there really is no alternative.  Nevertheless,
Drone’s self-importance is short lived.  Bagshaw is soon reported to be in the lead, sparked by
not much more than a report of him taking the second concession poll with six votes to two for
Smith.  The report of a four-vote lead in one poll triggers a similar rush of public displays of
support for Bagshaw.
Knowing that most voters are holding back their ballots until they have a good feeling of
who is going to win, Smith keeps his election-day machine at bay until the final hour of voting. 
When the hour arrives, Smith sends his supporters out to vote “and keep on voting till they make
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you quit” (147).  Meanwhile, he has fraudulent telegrams sent throughout the riding suggesting
that Smith is carrying other polls.  The result is a last-minute bandwagon-style stampede to the
polls.  Voters want to be on the winning side and thus be on the receiving end of patronage.  
With Smith the victor, Mariposans surround him to pledge their affinity and loyalty. 
Even Bagshaw’s volunteers Golgotha Gingham, Alf Trelawney, and Jefferson Thorpe confess to
Smith their long-held misgivings about supporting Bagshaw.  Leacock uses this opportunity to
paint women—who had yet to fully achieve the right to vote—as equally duplicitous as men. 
“To think that Mrs. Gingham and Mrs. Trelawney and Mrs. Thorpe had known all about this for
six months and kept quiet about it!” (149), gripes the narrator.  “I think there were a good many
Mrs. Ginghams in the country.  It is merely another proof that no woman is fit for politics” (149). 
Sketches’ unstable irony makes determinations about this jab debatable.  No doubt any
suggestion that women are unfit for politics because they act with equivalence to men is patently
absurd, especially from a classic liberal perspective.  Yet, Leacock’s classic liberalism is both
coloured by and at times tainted by his conservatism, suggesting Leacock is serious in this
remark: as but one example, in Elements of Political Science he claims that women being “as
well qualified as men” to vote is “still a debatable point” (227).  Regardless of whether or not
there is ironic intention in this jab, that wives were acting with duplicity equivalent to their
husbands echoes Leacock’s belief that while the suffrage movement is inevitable, very little
about politics will change once women gain the right to vote (“The Woman Question” 56-57).  
In the end, the Great Election is nothing more than a display of ignorance and self-
interest, on everyone’s behalf.  Facts are thrown aside, principles are tossed out the window,
reputations are besmirched, and relationships are trashed, all in a blind quest for power and
patronage.  Yet, the ends does not justify the means.  Government will not change for the better,
even though Leacock’s preferred candidate proves victorious.  Henry Bagshaw vanished from
Mariposa once elected, and it is clear that Josh Smith will do the same.  Upon victory, “Mr.
Smith, of course, said nothing.  He didn’t have to,—not for four years,—and he knew it” (150). 
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Just as Kernan says about satire and change, “constant movement without change forms the basis
of satire, and while we may be only half aware of the pattern as we read, it, more than any other
element, creates the tone of pessimism inherent in the genre” (33).  The Great Election does
nothing more than leave Mariposa in a state of political irresolution, thus creating a lingering
tone of pessimism about democracy’s ability to actualise substantial change. 
Curiously, Leacock’s attack on all of democracy’s players in Sunshine Sketches works in
an unseen but powerful anti-revolutionary way, with specific regard to socialist revolution. 
Leacock’s rejection of socialism is largely due to its program of democratic control of all realms
of society.  But democracy, as Sketches shows, is unable to exclusively serve public interest, so
long as its individual human actors remain self-interested.  As Leacock says about socialism in
The Unsolved Riddle of Social Justice,
Let anyone conversant with modern democracy as it is,—not as its founders dreamed of
it,—picture to himself the operation of a system whereby anything and everything is
controlled by elected officials, from whom there is no escape, outside of whom is no
livelihood and to whom all men must bow!  Democracy, let us grant it, is the best system
of government as yet operative in this world of sin.  Beside autocratic kingship it shines
with a white light; it is obviously the portal of the future.  But we know it now too well to
idealize its merits.  (111)
Sunshine Sketches does not idealise democracy’s merits, but rather it satirically blows apart the
ideal of democracy.  Democracy in Sketches is an exercise that channels the worst of self-interest. 
In this sense, Leacock is not just critiquing how the west is governed.  He is also undermining the
democratic structure of a socialist order. 
Social Solidarity and Collective Action: So Much for Revolution
Just like Arcadian Adventures with the Idle Rich, Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town
serves as an alternative-less critique.  Sketches picks at the economic and especially the political
frame that holds Mariposa together, but as Francis Zichy says, “with all its faults the world of
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Mariposa is, or was, the best world after all” (52).  Despite its shortcomings, politically and
economically, Leacock’s Mariposa still works.  Nowhere in Sketches is there something better
than liberal, market-based democracy for its self-interested actors to revolve into.
Curiously, what ultimately makes Mariposa work so well is not so much its unobstructed
liberal freedom, but rather the interventions placed on its freedom.  Just as often as Josh Smith
freely exploits self-interest, Smith intervenes in freedom to keep liberalism from harming the
community.  He fights the vocal minority forces of prohibition to keep liquor flowing.  He saves
both his clerk Billy and the Thorpes from financial catastrophe in the Cuban plantation scheme. 
And most notably, with the help of Judge Pepperleigh’s judicial intervention, he keeps the
church—an institution that Leacock believes forms the basis of society’s moral code—in
Mariposan hands.  These interventions reflect how Leacock knows full-well that the classic
economists are wrong to suggest that “the only rule of the game needed was to let things alone”
(“What is Left” 43).  Yet, the successful interventions in Mariposa, with the exception of Judge
Pepperleigh’s actions, take place absent the state.  For that matter, Mariposa does not even have a
civic government.  The lack of successful government intervention in Mariposa is perfectly
consistent with Leacock’s conservative belief that society must be allowed significant control
outside the immediate control of the state (Unsolved Riddle 142).  Mariposa is primarily in
individual hands, not collective state hands. 
The success of intervention to correct liberalism’s shortcomings in Mariposa lends
credence to Leacock’s observation in Our Heritage of Liberty that “whether this [liberal system]
is really a doctrine of liberty, or a rather different doctrine of social solidarity, or collective
action, is not so certain” (49).  Sketches reveals that unrestrained liberalism alone cannot hold
together a society, making social solidarity and collective action vital to keep its liberal system
afloat.  Could Mariposa still function had the church fallen to pecuniary interests, the Thorpes
and Billy been left bankrupted, or liquor been taken away?  Most likely not.  Had these situations
been allowed to unfold without restraint, the revolutionary rumblings of the Peter Pupkins of
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Mariposa would be given oxygen.  Just as Maynard Mack says in The Muse of Satire, satire often
comes “from the angle of social solidarity.... assert[ing] the validity and necessity of norms,
systemic values, and meanings” (84).  In this sense, Leacock’s Mariposa is Leacock’s ideal:
western society’s already-existent classic liberal system, where social solidarity and collective
action buttress liberalism’s flaws.   
Mariposa may be Leacock’s ideal, but any suggestion that he is prescribing an attainable
ideological ideal and agency with Mariposa is destroyed by Sketches’ closing.  Keeping with
Dustin Griffin’s point that satire’s prescriptive elements “do not serve as hortatory models or as
blueprints for social engineers; instead, they teasingly hold up an ideal that cannot be obtained”
(61), Leacock makes it clear that Mariposa is unattainable in an age of industrialisation and
urbanisation.  In the final sketch, “L’Envoi,” the book’s closing cry of “Mariposa! Mariposa!” is
left to “[grow] fainter and fainter in our ears, and we are sitting here again in the leather chairs of
the Mausoleum Club, talking of the little town in the Sunshine that we once knew” (156). 
Whatever higher ideals can be found in the town we once knew—a town, it cannot be missed,
that ultimately found itself in an electoral orgy of ignorance and self-interest—are no longer
possible.  Mariposa’s unattainability is Sketches’ final piece of satirical irresolution.  Just as there
is no ideological alternative in Sunshine Sketches, Mariposa itself is not meant to serve as an
tangential reorganisation of classic liberal society. 
In the end, Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town largely does what satire is said to do.  It
critiques, but fails to offer an articulated alternative to its critique.  The very fact that Mariposa’s
underlying anchor is liberal democracy reinforces Feinberg’s point that satire “cannot have any
great influence, for its implied alternative is not very different from what it is criticizing” (ITS
259).  Sunshine Sketches supports the existent western liberal democratic system of government;
Sunshine Sketches does not spell out a reasonable alternative to this system of government; and
Sunshine Sketches discounts any revolutionary alternatives to this system of government.  There
can be no doubt that Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town is not a revolutionary book. 
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Chapter Six: Looking Backward
More than a century has passed since Stephen Leacock penned Sunshine Sketches of a
Little Town and Arcadian Adventures with the Idle Rich.  Nowhere else than these books did
Leacock better articulate “the unending conflict between business and politics, between the
private gain and the public good, [that] has been for two generations the despair of modern
democracy” (Unsolved Riddle 114).  Yet, as pervasive as his writing has been—Leacock was the
English-speaking world’s best-selling humourist from about 1910-1925 (Lynch “From Serial to
Book” 96)—with perhaps the exception of Irish independence, no country in the English-
speaking world has fallen to an “effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications
for political authority in a society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and
noninstitutionalized actions that undermine existing authorities” (Goldstone 142).  Put more
plainly, there has been no revolution.  Por ahora.  Even though Robert C. Elliott is correct to
contend that satire “eats its way in implication through the most powerful-seeming structures”
(274), as Dustin Griffin observes, “the social and political order... is more resistant to whatever
power satire possesses than Elliott and others urged thirty years ago” (159).  The structures of
western liberal democracy have been nibbled at, but they are still standing.  This is true of
Leacock’s time, and it is true in the years that have passed since.  
Of course, asking any single book or even any single literary mode or genre to spawn a
revolution is a tall order.  But who can deny that satire in general and Leacock’s works in
particular are poor conduits of revolution?  Satire’s inability to guide revolution is due in some
part to Feinberg’s point that satire’s “implied alternative is not very different from what it is
criticizing” (ITS 259).  In Leacock’s case, he believes that “on the whole, the rule [of western
liberal systems] is not bad: it is free at least from the arrogance of caste and the power of
hereditary aristocracy that disfigures still the governments of the older world” (“Tyranny of
Prohibition” 64).  Leacock is not interested in ideologically changing the western liberal order,
and his satire reflects that.  
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However, satire’s inability to effect change goes beyond Feinberg’s beliefs about implied
alternatives.  Just as the intersection of the theory of satire with the theory of revolution suggests,
Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town and Arcadian Adventures with the Idle Rich critique the
existent system of government, but neither book proposes an alternative to the system.  There is
no revolutionary ideal, and there is no revolutionary agency accompanying the critique.  Critique
without ideal and agency, quite simply, lacks the ideological guidance to revolve into something
new.  Under the pen of Stephen Leacock, western liberal democracy is safe. 
Yet, concluding that satire does nothing is too sweeping.  It could be said that Leacock’s
critique is meant to preserve western institutions, not eat through them.  Leacock’s diagnosis of
the need for vigilance in a democracy would suggest that preservation is one of Leacock’s
purposes in writing such books:
The difficulty has been that the world, especially the English-speaking world of Britain
and America, too quickly accepted democracy, liberty and equality, as a closed chapter of
history, a permanent advance from which no retrogression need be feared.  We did not
realize that for these great things there is a price to be paid, a constant vigilance which is
the price of liberty and, for democracy, the constant presence of the inspiration which first
inspired it.  Without vigilance liberty is suppressed.  Without inspiration democracy is
just a form, an empty and deserted house for thieves to meet in.  (Heritage 56-57)
If Leacock’s satire is out to encourage vigilance, it is completely consistent with Ruben
Quintero’s belief that the satirist is a watchdog.  Quintero tells us that “no one expects a
watchdog to do the double duty of alarming others that the barn is on fire and of putting out the
blaze.  Satirists, that is, rouse us to put out the fire” (4).  We may have been roused, but we have
not put out the flames.  Every democratic fire in Sketches and Adventures remains either burning
or healthily smouldering today.  
Is the democracy of Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town or Arcadian Adventures with the
Idle Rich much different than democracy today?  Has the graft of Mayor McGrath come to an
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end?  Former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney secretly accepting cash-stuffed envelopes from
German lobbyist Karlheinz Schreiber (Canada 33) tells us that the answer is no.  Have the
suspicious land deals of Alderman Schwarzmantel or Mr. Furlong ceased to be?  Former
Saskatchewan Economy Minister Bill Boyd’s threat of expropriation to buy nuns’ land, then
paying nearly twelve times the price for party supporters’ neighbouring land (Leo) tells us that
the answer is no.  Have Lucullus Fyshe and Mayor McGrath’s deals with sworn enemies to keep
power stopped?  Former Liberal cabinet minister David Emerson’s appointment to the Harper
government’s cabinet two weeks after proclaiming himself “Stephen Harper’s worst nightmare”
(Akin A11) tells us that the answer is no.  Has the simplistic election sloganeering in Plutoria or
Mariposa been replaced by substantive policy debate?  Former Prime Minister “Kim!”
Campbell’s infamous statement in the 1993 general election that “an election is no time to
discuss serious issues” (Ferreira) tells us that the answer is no.  Have plutocrats lost their ability
to get the public policies they want?  Finance Minister Bill Morneau’s 2016 repeal of nearly a
billion dollars in student tax credits (Fraser) all while leaving the capital gains exemption for the
rich untouched tells us that the answer is no.  Have reporters and media outlets eschewed partisan
bias?  Mike Duffy’s appointment to the senate as a Conservative only three months after using
his daily CTV News show to help sink the 2008 Liberal campaign (“CTV broke ethics code”)
tells us that the answer is no.  Have Josh Smith’s fraudulent election-day communications come
to a halt?  Conservative staffer Michael Sona’s jail sentence for orchestrating misleading
robocalls on election day 2011 (Payton) tells us that the answer is no.  And this is just the
beginning.  Echoes of Mrs. Buncomhearst’s sweeping claim that she represents “50,000 women
voters in this city” are heard in the National Organization of Women’s claim to protect the rights
of “all women” (About).  Judge Pepperleighs of all stripes are still being accused of politicising
the courtroom.  Physical intimidation may not be commonplace during elections, but social
media mobbing is the norm.  The list goes on... 
The seeming inability of Leacock’s satire to effect systemic political change—especially
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change of the revolutionary variety—is a trait that appears to have been carried into
contemporary satire.  Today’s satire is omnipresent and hyper-topical.  From satirical news
websites to relentlessly political cable and late-night television programs, it quickly reacts to
daily political events and, in doing so, often contributes to discussions about these events.  In
fact, contemporary political satire has become a primary source for learning about and
understanding the present state of the world.  As Sophia McClennan and Remy Maisel point out
in Is Satire Saving Our Nation?, “contemporary satire has played a central role in shaping public
debates and in fostering productive engagement with society” (7).  Productive political
engagement is a good thing, but contemporary satire’s rush to cast judgment on the political
malfeasance of the day is rarely accompanied by a truly revolutionary prescription for change. 
This should come as no surprise.  Keeping with Theda Skocpol’s observation about the literati
being dependent upon and intertwined with the ruling elite (61), the bulk of contemporary
political satire is ultimately the product of global media corporations.  These corporations, as
media historian and theorist Robert McChesney has amply proven, are deeply embedded
elements of the ruling structures of power (see, for example, The Political Economy of Media). 
While these corporations’ satirical products may be seen as radical or subversive, it is wise to put
such views through the lens of Leonard Feinberg’s stance on satirical radicalness:
Because every society offers innumerable opportunities for criticism, the satirist is more
likely to seem liberal or radical than conservative or reactionary.  In practice, however,
few satirists have been sufficiently courageous, or sufficiently radical, to attack the basic
economic or political organization of their society.  (TS 253-54) 
As products of the ruling structure, how radical can contemporary political satire be? 
Nevertheless, what appears to be true about satire today may be demonstrably false
tomorrow.  The internet’s end-run around traditional gatekeepers of mass communication has
allowed green shoots of independent satire rooted in more radical polities to sprout.  Indigenous
satirical news sites The Walking Eagle News and The Feather nicely illustrate this new growth. 
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However, as The Feather’s founder Ryan Moccasin believes, “at the end of the day, satirical
news is helping people find laughter through all the madness” (qtd. in “Saskatoon Satire Site”). 
It appears that even in communities that have largely existed outside the established structures of
power, there are still open questions about how much change satire can accomplish.
Ryan Moccasin’s belief about satire’s use as a therapeutic is consistent with Stephen
Leacock’s view that humour seldom is a corrective.  For Leacock, the laughter it generates
should function as “a relief from pain... a consolation against the shortcomings of life itself”
(Humor and Humanity 60).  These words intersect with Feinberg’s belief that despite satire’s
aesthetic appeal, nothing will actually be done with it:
One of the reasons why we get more pleasure from satire than from a sermon, even when
the satire is making the exact same point as the sermon, is that we have an uncomfortable
feeling that the minister expects us to do something about it.  We enjoy the satire because
we know that nobody really expects us to do anything about it, and that we have no real
intention of ever doing anything about it.  It may not be the moral reaction, but for most
human beings it is the reaction.  (ITS 7) 
Satire, if viewed in this therapeutic way, does not rouse us into action.  Rather, it rouses us to
laugh and let the fires burn.
Even if Leacock is resigned about the possibilities of creating change in the present—a
position largely consistent with his conservative outlook—there may be a slow heuristic purpose
to satire, that can lead society to eventual improvement.  Leacock was a teacher, after all. 
Hermann Real reminds us that “as a teacher, [the satirist] also knows that in order to achieve his
goal, ‘methods of indirection’ are likely to be more successful than frontal assaults” (17). 
Viewing satire as a method of indirection is compatible with satire’s absent prescription of ideal
and agency.  To this point, in “The Revision of Democracy,” Leacock discusses how the
problems of democracy will not be solved by coercion or prescription.  Rather, Leacock believes
the problems will be solved once society realises on its own that democracy is flawed:
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as soon as the mass of the people come to see that what is needed is honest government,
efficient government, technical government, entrusted to people who make it their work
in life, the change will come itself.  We cannot frame it first, like an American party
platform.  First must come the “ideal,” then as a consequence the fact, and last of all the
legislation.  (15)
The belief that people cannot be made good by legislation is a long-standing tenet of
conservative thought.  Individuals must each come to their own conclusions about what
constitutes goodness and honesty, and only then will change manifest itself.  Maybe satire such
as Leacock’s has a long-term heuristic purpose, yet to be achieved.
Regardless of whether or not satire is a preserver, a comforter, or a long-term heuristic
tool, satire—or at least Stephen Leacock’s satire—is not revolutionary.  The problems of
democracy that Leacock diagnoses in Arcadian Adventures with the Idle Rich and Sunshine
Sketches of a Little Town still remain.  Satirical critiques such as Leacock’s do not sketch out
utopias, but rather expose what appear to be intractable human conditions.  In the words of
British Conservative Member of Parliament Jacob Rees-Mogg, “conservatives understand human
nature as it is, not as it might have been hoped for in the Garden of Eden” (3:26-32).  With views
like this, it is little wonder that most satirists are conservatives.  
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